Kurtiss did not comply with rule 955, as required by a 2002 discipline order. Failure to comply with the rule is grounds for disbarment.

The underlying discipline was imposed for Kurtiss’ failure to competently perform legal services, obey a court order, communicate with a client or cooperate with the bar’s investigation. He also improperly withdrew from employment.

Kurtiss also was disciplined last year for failing to perform competently or communicate with a client.

In a default proceeding, the State Bar Court found that Woods did not comply with rule 955, as ordered in a 2002 discipline. She did not submit to the Supreme Court an affidavit stating that she notified her clients, opposing counsel and other pertinent parties of her suspension from practice.

The underlying discipline resulted from Woods’ trust account violations, specifically commingling trust and personal funds and writing checks against insufficient funds.

Similar misconduct led to more discipline in 2003.

In 2000, Lincoln was convicted in Texas on a federal charge of falsely representing his Social Security number, a felony. As a result, he gave up his license to practice in the state.

Originally charged with five felonies, the case resulted from Lincoln applying for a checking account using a false Social Security number.

In a second matter, he was disbarred from U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas after a federal judge requested an investigation of Lincoln because two of his clients had a falsified receipt. The receipt purported to be from the federal court clerk and represented funds the clients had given Lincoln. The clients believed Lincoln was depositing their money in an escrow account related to their case.

Two days before a hearing by the federal court’s admissions committee, Lincoln went to his clients’ home, instructed them not to tell the judge that he gave them the receipt, which he asked them not to produce, and he gave the clients a cashier’s check for $6,000. He did not appear at the hearing.

In a previous lawsuit, the same judge determined that Lincoln was involved in discovery abuse and filed duplicative motions. The judge issued sanctions and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

The State Bar Court determined that Lincoln’s misconduct in Texas amounted to violations of California law as well.

Porter was convicted in 2002 of one count of making a false declaration in his bankruptcy proceeding. The conviction meets the criteria for summary disbarment because it involved a felony and moral turpitude.

Severo stipulated to misconduct in three matters.

In a personal injury case, a $320,000 settlement check was deposited by the insurance company into a money market account for which the client was the sole signatory. A month after receiving the settlement, the client filed a petition for fee arbitration. Severo then sued the client, alleging breach of contract for failing to pay his legal fees.

He and the client eventually settled, and the agreement included a provision in which she agreed not to file a complaint against Severo with the State Bar. Severo dismissed his suit against his client.

He stipulated that the provision was improper.

In the other matters, Severo did not return his clients’ many phone calls and stipulated that he did not respond to their reasonable status inquiries.

Severo has been disciplined twice, in 1986 and 1998.

In mitigation, his clients were not harmed by his misconduct.

Noble stipulated to misconduct in six consolidated cases. Six of the matters were criminal cases in which Noble failed to appear in court and/or did not return his clients’ phone calls or refund unearned fees. He improperly withdrew from representation in two cases.

In the sixth matter, he set up a personal injury law practice with a non-lawyer who obtained case files, negotiated settlements, hired and paid staff and paid Noble’s salary. Forming a law partnership with a non-attorney is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In mitigation, Noble has no record of discipline since his 1979 admission to the bar.

Thompson stipulated to three counts of misconduct related to his client trust account. He negotiated a settlement for a client in a personal injury case and gave her her share. However, he had not yet deposited the settlement funds, so the funds he gave the client were from another client.

After depositing the settlement check, Thompson made a series of cash withdrawals, resulting in a shortfall in the trust account over a two-month period. When the client’s doctors and insurance company were not paid, she complained to the State Bar, and although Thompson said the funds “were only recently disbursed,” in fact he had not paid them at the time.

Thompson stipulated that he failed to maintain client funds in trust or promptly pay out settlement funds and he commingled personal and client funds.

In mitigation, he had financial difficulties that contributed to the mishandling of his account, and he made restitution to a hospital and his client’s insurer. He also practiced for 24 years with only a prior reproval in 1993.

Jorgensen stipulated to 25 counts of misconduct in nine consolidated cases, including failure to perform legal services competently, keep clients informed about developments in their cases, refund unearned fees, promptly return all client papers or comply with probation conditions attached to a 2001 public reproval, and improperly withdrawing from employment.

Most of Jorgensen’s cases were bankruptcy proceedings that were either not filed or dismissed because they were incomplete. Jorgensen then did not inform his clients about the dismissals or refund their fees.

He also did no work for a client who hired him to clear title for a piece of real property she inherited.

At the time of the misconduct, Jorgensen was considering changing careers and abandoned his clients. In mitigation, he was candid and cooperative with his victims and the State Bar, and has indicated he has a renewed commitment to his practice.

In a default proceeding, the State Bar Court found that Fochetti’s 2000 conviction for domestic violence warranted discipline.

A former attorney for the Kings County District Attorney’s Office, Fochetti argued with her husband over two days when he tried to take away her gun and her car keys. Fochetti’s doctor had instructed her husband to take away his wife’s firearms for her safety. During the argument, she bit her husband’s right shoulder.

Fochetti’s husband told police his wife had a drug problem and had left a rehab program without permission.

Wallace stipulated to six counts of misconduct stemming from a real estate matter for which she received $2,500 in advance fees. The statute of limitations ran before Wallace filed a complaint. She did not respond to her client’s phone calls or letters, and when the client hired a new lawyer, she did not provide the file.

She stipulated that she failed to perform legal services competently, keep her client informed about developments in her case, respond to client inquiries, promptly release a client file or refund unearned fees, and she improperly withdrew from employment.

In mitigation, she provided evidence of her good character.

Potratz stipulated to two counts of misconduct in handling his client trust account. After his bank notified the State Bar that Potratz wrote two checks against insufficient funds, the bar examined his account and learned that Potratz wrote numerous checks for things such as car payments.

Potratz told the bar he represents primarily criminal defendants, and keeps their money in his trust account so he can pay their bills, including car payments. However, the bar learned Potratz also wrote at least 18 checks against the account for personal use, including payments for electronics and his office rent and phone bill. He also was issued three warning letters, two for writing checks against insufficient funds, and attended client trust accounting school as the result of a previous complaint.

In a default proceeding, the bar court found that O’Keefe practiced law while suspended, committed an act of moral turpitude, failed to return unearned fees or provide an accounting to his client and did not maintain a current address with the bar.

He was suspended for about six weeks in 2001 for failing to pay bar dues. During that time, he agreed to represent a client in a partnership lawsuit and accepted a $5,000 advance fee. When the client later terminated the employment, O’Keefe returned his file but did not refund any money. He did not respond to inquiries from the bar.

In mitigation, he practiced for 29 years without a record of discipline.

In a default proceeding, the bar court found that Kolter failed to communicate with a client, perform legal services competently, return unearned fees or cooperate with the bar’s investigation, and he improperly withdrew from employment.

In a divorce matter, he represented a client whose husband lived in New York. Although he prepared documents, including a draft petition for dissolution, he did not file the petition for more than a year after he was hired. The court rejected his application for an order of publication because there was no affidavit or declaration regarding attempts to serve the husband in New York.

Nearly two years after she hired Kolter, the client asked for a status report, but Kolter did not respond. After complaining to the State Bar, the client sent him a letter asking that he complete her case within 60 days or immediately return her file and refund her $2,000 retainer. Kolter did not respond or complete the divorce.

A short time later, Kolter was suspended for failure to pay bar dues and a month later was placed on disciplinary suspension for a year. He never notified his client about his change of status, never completed the divorce and never refunded her fees.

The previous discipline was imposed for misconduct in eight client matters, including failure to perform legal services competently, communicate, maintain client funds in a trust account or promptly pay out client funds, and he committed acts of moral turpitude.

In a default proceeding, the bar court found that Engquist was convicted of driving under the influence and driving without a license. He had four prior DUIs.

He was disciplined in 1992 as a result of one of the DUIs and again in 1994 for violating the terms of his probation.

Archdeacon stipulated to 21 counts of misconduct in seven consolidated cases.

In a slip-and-fall that he settled for $40,000 before trial, he disbursed some money to his client but withheld more than $17,000 for possible lien reimbursement. After two years, the client asked that she receive the rest of the money, but Archdeacon had spent it. Although he eventually paid his client, the payments were from funds other than the original settlement he received on her behalf.

In another personal injury case, he filed suit but later failed to appear at a hearing and eventually informed his client he was suspended from practice. He tried unsuccessfully to find a new lawyer for his client.

Archdeacon obtained a settlement from two defendants in another personal injury case, but waited more than a year to provide the funds to his client. When he did, he wrote a single check to the client, a hospital and a doctor, so the client could not cash it. A short time later, the client declared bankruptcy and the bankruptcy lawyer instructed Archdea-con to reissue the check to his client alone. He did not do so because he had used the money for his own purposes.

With respect to one of the defendants, he never finalized the settlement.

He abandoned a medical malpractice client, misappropriated funds from another, and did not report or pay sanctions of more than $1,000 imposed by a judge in Santa Cruz who dismissed his case with prejudice.

Archdeacon also did not take the MPRE or attend ethics school on time, as required by a 1998 discipline.

In mitigation, he had emotional and financial difficulties at the time of the misconduct, lost his house to foreclosure due to expenses related to his divorce, he cooperated with the bar’s investigation, and he enrolled in the Lawyer Assistance Program.

Chazen stipulated that he failed to perform legal services competently, refund unearned fees or deposit client funds in a trust account. He substituted in to two cases for the same client, but did not deposit into his client trust account money for a handwriting expert and costs to take depositions and obtain copies of deposition transcripts. He also never filed the substitution of attorney with the court.

When the client fired him and requested a return of the $4,350 in advanced fees and costs, Chazen gave the client a promissory note and promised to repay the money in a month. He did not do so and the client obtained a small claims judgment; Chazen never repaid the money.

In mitigation, Chazen has no record of discipline since his 1980 admission to the bar and his conduct was caused by his preoccupation with prostate cancer.

Chacon stipulated to four counts of misconduct in a personal injury claim he settled for his niece for $50,000. After disbursing funds, he kept about $4,200 for payment of medical costs.

Five months later, his niece asked why he had not returned her original X-rays to the medical center or paid her health provider. Three months later, the woman’s mother sent a similar letter.

After the medical provider was paid, the client’s mother learned that its bill was nearly $1,400 less than Chacon represented; he kept that money as a fee and gave his client $81.14, claiming that was the difference.

Chacon stipulated that he committed acts of moral turpitude by falsely stating the amount of the medical lien and misappropriating client funds, and that he did not promptly return client property or cooperate with the bar’s investigation.

In mitigation, Chacon has no record of discipline since his 1989 admission to the bar.

In a default proceeding, the bar court found that Embree failed to perform legal services competently, communicate with a client, return client papers or cooperate with the bar’s investigation, and he improperly withdrew from employment in a civil case.

Although he filed an answer and a cross-complaint on behalf of his defendant client, he did not file a mandatory settlement conference brief and was sanctioned. The parties reached agreement, with the plaintiff required to provide Embree’s client with an accounting relating to real property they owned. They also agreed to request binding arbitration to resolve remaining issues.

The cases were dismissed when the parties agreed to go to arbitration. However, Embree did not take any action to enforce the original stipulation, to require the plaintiff to produce an accounting or to take her deposition. He did not provide his client with the arbitration brief, as she asked. When he did not file a brief or prepare for the arbitration, the client fired him, requested a refund of unearned fees, a return of her file and a substitution of attorney.

The file included the client’s notes based on her review of more than 3,000 pages of documents the plaintiff had produced. The client was able to obtain a copy of the file from the plaintiff’s attorney (at a cost of $374), but could not retrieve her notes from Embree. He also never signed a substitution of attorney form or refunded unearned fees. Over the course of his representation, he did not respond to at least 36 letters from his client.

Embree also was publicly reproved in 2001, but did not comply with conditions of his probation.

Shim violated the terms of a 2001 public reproval by not providing proof of attendance at ethics school or passage of the MPRE. The discipline was imposed for failing to perform legal services competently or communicate with a client.

Shim also was privately reproved in 1997 for a conviction for reckless driving involving alcohol and for violating the terms of an agreement in lieu of discipline. Last year, he was disciplined for violating court orders, maintaining an unjust action and failing to cooperate with the bar’s investigation.

His default was entered in the newest discipline because he failed to participate in the proceeding.

In a default proceeding, the State Bar Court found that Comess committed eight acts of misconduct in a single matter, including failure to perform legal services competently, communicate with a client, return a client file, obey a court order or cooperate with the bar’s investigation, and he improperly withdrew from employment and practiced law while suspended for not completing the MCLE requirement.

He represented the defendant in a criminal matter and told the court he was ready to begin trial when in fact he was suspended. He later informed the court, which continued the trial three times.

In total, he made about 14 court appearances in eight months on his client’s behalf; he was suspended for about a month. On a day trial was to begin, he told his client he wanted to drop his case but that the judge might not permit him to do so. The client understood Comess to mean the he might withdraw at the next scheduled court date and he called Comess more than 25 times in the next few weeks.

Comess told the client he would prepare a petition related to his defense, but he never called the client again. He also did not respond to five certified letters. When the actual trial date arrived, the client appeared but Comess did not. He never complied with the court’s order to bring all discovery to the clerk by the following day and he never returned his client’s documents.

In default matters in two cases, the bar court found that Alexander practiced law while not entitled, failed to return unearned fees, cooperate with the bar’s investigation or maintain a current address with the bar, and he committed an act of moral turpitude.

In the first case, he represented a criminal defendant who learned from the district attorney the day before her scheduled arraignment that she would not be charged. Alexander had never communicated with the D.A. or the police concerning the allegations. He did not return the client’s subsequent phone calls or return her $4,500 advance fee.

Alexander also made court appearances on behalf of two clients while he was suspended for failing to pay his bar dues. As a result, the court issued a stayed bench warrant for Alexander’s clients. When he and the clients failed to appear for a hearing, the court issued the warrants. The next day, Alexander appeared on behalf of the clients, said he had been reinstated and the court recalled the warrants.

Alexander was privately reproved in 1996 as the result of a conviction for driving with a suspended license.

Jones stipulated to misconduct in six consolidated cases, including failing to respond to client inquiries, return a client’s file or cooperate with the bar’s investigation, and she improperly withdrew from representation.

In one matter, for instance, Jones represented a client in a divorce. The day trial was to begin, the matter settled and Jones was ordered to prepare the formal judgment and provide it to opposing counsel before filing with the court. She never did so, claiming that the client did not pay fees Jones claimed were owed. She did not return several phone calls from the client.

Jones failed to properly withdraw from representation once she decided not to proceed with the case and did not promptly return the client’s file.

In a child custody case in which she represented the children’s mother, Jones reviewed the court file and otherwise investigated the situation and concluded the mother had not participated in her children’s lives sufficiently to have a viable case. Jones advised the mother to pick up her children for all scheduled visitation and to determine if the children’s father attempted to interfere.

The mother’s current husband contacted Jones, but she asked that the client contact her instead. The client did not do so, and her husband later fired Jones and sought a refund of unearned fees. Jones believed all fees had been earned and she did not respond to the husband’s message.

In another matter, Jones did not go forward on a case because she said the client owed her money. In another, she advised her client to dismiss her case and believed the client agreed to the dismissal. The client, however, said she did not fully understand the situation and did not agree to the dismissal. Jones did not adequately inform her when the case was dismissed.

In mitigation, Jones was caring for and was trustee for her mother, who was suffering from Alzheimer’s and other serious medical problems. As a result, Jones was away from her practice. Her ability to work, particularly to handle communications, was negatively affected.

Sacks was convicted in 2002 of aiding a violation of a federal court order regarding frozen assets. He represented defendants in an FTC case whose assets were frozen as part of a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. Sacks was bound by the order.

His law firm received four payments totaling more than $77,000 from assets that were subject to the TRO.

The court later found Sacks in contempt, but said the contempt was partially cured by Sacks’ return of the money to the FTC receiver at the conclusion of the hearing. He was sentenced to six months in prison and supervised release for one year upon release from prison.

Sacks stipulated that his conduct warranted discipline. In mitigation, he has no prior record of discipline and he cooperated with the bar’s investigation.

In a default proceeding, the State Bar Court found that Smeal did not comply with the conditions of a reproval. He did not file four quarterly probation reports or submit proof that he completed ethics school or took the MPRE.

The reproval was issued for failing to inform one client of significant developments in the case and for failing to respond to a second client’s status inquiries.

In a default proceeding, the State Bar Court found that Asher misused his client trust account by issuing 67 checks for personal use.

In a divorce matter, he filed a petition for dissolution and continued to represent his client for almost two years. After a judgment was issued, the client tried to contact Asher for several months and asked to have his file returned. Asher refused, telling the client to get a copy of the file from the court.

The bar court found that he failed to return client property.

Asher has no record of discipline, but his record was given little weight in mitigation because he only was in practice for three and a half years at the time of the misconduct.

DeWitt issued about 35 phony parking citations to cars parked on public streets and in commercial parking lots in several Bay Area communities. The citations looked like valid tickets and were issued in the name of “Metro Parking Services.”

DeWitt stipulated that the tickets were modeled on a citation issued by a privately contracted parking enforcement company called Metropolitan System Parking, used by several jurisdictions where DeWitt wrote tickets.

He received payment from three ticket recipients, one for $125 and two for $70 each. He cashed the first check but not the others, which were received after the Berkeley police told DeWitt to stop issuing citations.

DeWitt’s actions violated the Business & Professions Code, which requires attorneys to maintain only actions or proceedings that appear legal or just.

In mitigation, DeWitt has no prior record of discipline, he cooperated with the bar’s investigation and he made restitution before the stipulation was reached.

Eiser stipulated to misconduct in five consolidated matters, all stemming from his work with Marc Padilla, a non-lawyer who told Eiser that another lawyer had abandoned her practice to him. Eiser gave Padilla the account information, check register and checks for his client trust account, even though Eiser was the only signatory. Padilla’s wife was responsible for the trust account and the couple did not allow Eiser to review the account records, although he claims he reviewed client settlement distribution worksheets. Padilla paid Eiser $3,000 a month.

Eiser severed his relationship with Padilla after Padilla’s office was raided and he was questioned about allegations that he had raped a female client at gunpoint. Police allegedly located a firearm and illegal narcotics in the office.

Padilla and his wife retained control of the trust account, although Eiser says he reviewed his records using an automated banking system. He closed the account after discovering that $15,000 had been deposited without his knowledge.

In each of the cases, Eiser stipulated that he lent his name to be used by a non-lawyer, aided Padilla in the unauthorized practice of law and committed acts of moral turpitude. His law office did not pay medical providers, checks bounced, messages from clients and other lawyers were not answered, files were not returned and clients did not endorse checks that were cashed. Padilla threatened to take one client’s account to collection.

In mitigation, Eiser had emotional or physical difficulties at the time of the misconduct.

He was disciplined in 2002 for failing to maintain client funds in a trust account, commingling and committing acts of moral turpitude.

Todd stipulated that he repeatedly used his client trust account to pay personal expenses.

He was privately reproved in 1995 and in 1998 was disciplined for failing to perform legal services competently.

In mitigation, he acted in good faith in the most recent case.

Scheck filed a breach of contract suit for his client, but did not advise the client of the need to respond to interrogatories and other requests from the defendants. Scheck and his client did not appear at a hearing to compel responses and were sanctioned; Scheck did not notify his client about the hearing or advise him that the defendants’ motion was granted.

The complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Scheck did not notify his client or file a motion to set aside the dismissal.

He stipulated that he failed to perform legal services competently.

Scheck was disciplined in 1995 for failing to perform competently.

In mitigation, he had throat cancer which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. After he substituted out of the case, he admitted his malpractice in order to help his client set aside the dismissal.