Rule 1.3 Diligence
(Proposed Rule Adopted by the Board on March 9, 2017)

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally, repeatedly, recklessly or with gross negligence fail to act with reasonable* diligence in representing a client.

(b) For purposes of this rule, “reasonable diligence” shall mean that a lawyer acts with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and does not neglect or disregard, or unduly delay a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.

Comment

[1] This rule addresses only a lawyer’s responsibility for his or her own professional diligence. See rules 5.1 and 5.3 with respect to a lawyer's disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

[2] See rule 1.1 with respect to a lawyer’s duty to perform legal services with competence.
In connection with the consideration of current rule 3-110 (Failure to Act Competently), the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Commission”) has evaluated American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence) and relevant California disciplinary case law concerning the issue of diligence. While there is no direct counterpart in the current California rules, the concept of diligence is found in current rule 3-110 as a part of a lawyer's duty of competent representation. The result of the evaluation is proposed rule 1.3 (Diligence).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Two main issues were considered in drafting proposed rule 1.3. The first issue was the threshold question of whether to retain diligence as a part of competence or move it to a standalone rule. The second issue was whether a specific duty of “promptness” should be included with a standalone rule on diligence.

Regarding the first issue, as of the 1983 amendments to the rules, the rule on failing to act competently has included a definition of competence that imposes an express duty of diligence in a lawyer's performance of legal services. rule 3-110(B) states:

For purposes of this rule, “competence” in any legal service shall mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.

This standard has been routinely used by the State Bar Court in finding culpability for a competence violation when a lawyer possessed requisite knowledge and skills but nevertheless failed to perform services in a diligent manner. (See, for example, In the Matter of Layton (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366, 377 and In the Matter of Hindin (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 657, 684.)

Although there is no deficiency in California law impairing the prosecution of disciplinary actions for lawyer misconduct involving diligence, the Commission is recommending that the concept of diligence be moved to a separate, standalone rule. This recommendation furthers that part of the Commission’s Charter encouraging the Commission to consider proposed rule amendments that eliminate “unnecessary differences between California’s rules and the rules used by a preponderance of the states (in some cases in reliance on the American Bar Association’s Model Rules) in order to help promote a national standard with respect to professional

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1 A separate executive summary is provided for the Commission’s proposed amendments to rule 3-110. See the summary of proposed rule 1.1 (Competence).

2 Similar to the current California rule, the Restatement 3d of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 16, Reporter’s Note to Comment d treats diligence as being a component of competence and not a separate duty.

3 Every jurisdiction, except California, has adopted Model Rule 1.3, has a variant of the rule that treats the duty of diligence separate and distinct from the duty of competence, or addresses diligence as a separate duty in its competence rule (Texas).
responsibility issues whenever possible.” In addition to furthering the national uniformity goal of the Commission’s Charter, proposed rule 1.3 would enhance respect for and confidence in the legal profession by highlighting the concept of diligence as a key professional responsibility, rather than subsuming it within the competence rule. “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination . . . . Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness.” Model Rule 1.3, comment [3].

Regarding the second issue of a specific duty of “promptness,” the Commission is recommending that “promptness” not be included in proposed rule 1.3. The Commission believes that the combination of separate rules on competence and diligence adequately guards against the misconduct that is intended to be prohibited. Including the concept of “promptness” might lead to confusion when a lawyer is charged with both failing to act competently and failing to perform diligently. It is not clear what the concept of “promptness” adds if there are separate rules on competence and diligence. Most significantly, there are other rules that by their own terms already include a timing requirement of prompt compliance. As just two examples: (1) rule 3-500 (Communication) requires “promptly complying with reasonable requests for information” from a client; and (2) rule 3-700 (Termination of Employment) requires that upon termination of a client’s representation, a lawyer must “[p]romptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.” The overlay of an across-the-board requirement of “promptness” would be redundant in the case of these rules and other rules that include their own timing requirement.

In addition to these two main issues, other proposed amendments include the following.

- In paragraph (a), clarifying that the prohibition concerning diligence is aligned with the longstanding standard on competence by specifically formulating the prohibition to provide that a lawyer shall not “intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, or repeatedly fail to act with reasonable diligence.”
- In paragraph (b), adding to the Model Rule’s definition of “reasonable diligence,” the qualification that a lawyer act “with commitment and dedication to the interest of the client.”
- In Comment [1], providing a cross reference to a lawyer’s duty to supervise in proposed rules 5.1 and 5.3.
- In Comment [2], providing a cross reference to the competence rule, proposed rule 1.1.

**National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 1.3**

As California does not presently have a direct counterpart to Model Rule 1.3, this section reports on the adoption of the Model Rule in United States’ jurisdictions.

**Illinois Rule 1.3 Diligence**

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

The ABA Comparison Chart, entitled “Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3: Diligence,” revised May 13, 2015, is available at:
Thirty-nine states have adopted Model Rule 1.3 verbatim. Seven jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 1.3. Two states have adopted a version of the rule that is substantially different to Model Rule 1.3.

**Post Public Comment Revisions**

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment, the Commission reordered paragraph (a) to more clearly identify the fact that “gross negligence” is an existing basis for discipline. In paragraph (b), “without just cause” was deleted to avoid a misunderstanding there could be “just cause” to “unduly delay” a legal matter.

With these changes, the Board authorized an additional 45-day public comment period on the revised proposed rule.

**Final Modifications to the Proposed Rule**

After consideration of comments received in response to the additional 45-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.
I. CURRENT ABA MODEL RULE

[There is no California Rule that corresponds to Model Rule 1.3, from which proposed Rule 1.3 is derived.]

Rule 1.3 Diligence

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

[2] A lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client’s legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client’s interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer’s trustworthiness. A lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer’s client.

[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer’s employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer
relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.

[5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner’s death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer’s death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. Rule 28 of the American Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (providing for court appointment of a lawyer to inventory files and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabled lawyer).

II. FINAL VOTES BY THE COMMISSION AND THE BOARD

Commission:

Date of Vote: January 20, 2017
Action: Recommend Board Adoption of Proposed Rule 1.3
Vote: 13 (yes) – 1 (no) – 0 (abstain)

Board:

Date of Vote: March 9, 2017
Action: Board Adoption of Proposed Rule 1.3
Vote: 11 (yes) – 0 (no) – 0 (abstain)

III. COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULE (CLEAN)

Rule 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally, repeatedly, recklessly or with gross negligence fail to act with reasonable* diligence in representing a client.

(b) For purposes of this rule, "reasonable diligence" shall mean that a lawyer acts with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and does not neglect or disregard, or unduly delay a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.
Comment

[1] This rule addresses only a lawyer's responsibility for his or her own professional diligence. See rules 5.1 and 5.3 with respect to a lawyer's disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

[2] See rule 1.1 with respect to a lawyer's duty to perform legal services with competence.

IV. COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULE (REDLINE TO ABA MODEL RULE 1.3)

Rule 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally, repeatedly, recklessly or with gross negligence fail to act with reasonable* diligence and promptness in representing a client.

(b) For purposes of this rule, “reasonable diligence” shall mean that a lawyer acts with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and does not neglect or disregard, or unduly delay a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.

Comment

[1] This rule addresses only a lawyer’s responsibility for his or her own professional diligence. See rules 5.1 and 5.3 with respect to a lawyer’s disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See rule 1.2. The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

[2] A lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. See rule 1.1 with respect to a lawyer’s duty to perform legal services with competence.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client’s legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client’s interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer’s trustworthiness. A lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from
agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer’s client.

[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer’s employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See rule 1.2.

[5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner’s death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer’s death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. rule 28 of the American Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (providing for court appointment of a lawyer to inventory files and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabled lawyer).

V. RULE HISTORY

The closest counterpart to proposed Rule 1.3 is current rule 3-110. Rule 3-110 prohibits a lawyer from reckless, intentional or repeated acts of incompetent provision of legal services. Competence for purposes of this rule is defined to include diligence.

A. History of Rule 3-110 Failing to Act Competently

Current rule 3-110 originated in 1975 with former rule 6-101, which prohibited a lawyer from “willfully or habitually”1 performing legal services “if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know” that the lawyer “does not possess the learning and skill ordinarily

1 The “habitual” standard was derived from California case law which, at the time former rule 6-101 was adopted, was the primary California authority providing for discipline of incompetent members of the State Bar. See Ridley v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 551, 560 [99 Cal.Rptr. 873]; Simmons v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 719, 729 [87 Cal.Rptr. 368]; Grove v. State Bar (1967) 66 Cal.2d 680, 683-84 [58 Cal.Rptr. 564].
possessed by lawyers” who perform “similar services” in the “same or similar locality.” (Rule 6-101(1)).

In a separate paragraph (2), former rule 6-101 also prohibited a lawyer from failing to “use reasonable diligence and his best judgment” in exercising his skill and learning “to accomplish, with reasonable speed, the purpose for which he was employed.”

Rule 6-101 was amended in 1983 to state that a lawyer “shall not intentionally or with reckless disregard or repeatedly fail to perform legal services competently.” The operative term “willfully” was replaced by “intentionally or with reckless disregard” to address concern that “willfully” is confused with the concept of a “willful breach” of the Rules under Business and Professions Code § 6077. The substitution avoided that confusion but preserved the meaning of the original language. (See Bates stamp page 00008 of “Memorandum In Support Of Request That Proposed Amendments To Rule 6-101, Rules Of Professional Conduct Of The State Bar Of California Be Approved By The Supreme Court Of California And Supporting Documents,” August 11, 1983 (“1983 Memorandum”).)

Another amendment in 1983 substituted “repeatedly” for “habitually.” The word “repeatedly” was regarded as a more accurate description of the intended disciplinary standard.

The 1983 amendments also added a definition of competence. Rule 6-101(A)(1) provided that: “Attorney competence means the application of sufficient learning, skill, and diligence necessary to discharge the member’s duties arising from the employment or representation.” The language of the definition was intended to accomplish two objectives: (1) incorporate the concept of “diligence” into the definition; and (2) emphasize that competence means the lawyer’s application and performance of skill and knowledge, and does not merely reflect that the lawyer possesses those qualities. On the latter point, the 1983 Memorandum states:

“The rule’s definition of competence focuses upon whether or not the lawyer has performed legal services on behalf of the client competently rather than upon innate or inherent abilities, skills or qualities. The rule provides for an examination of an attorney’s conduct and actions, rather than an attorney’s intent, in the performance of legal services.” (See page 4 of the 1983 Memorandum.)

In 1989, former rule 6-101 was renumbered 3-110 as part of a comprehensive revision and renumbering of the entire rules. Rule 3-110 did not entail any major substantive revisions. (See page 31 of Bar Misc. No. 5626, “Request That The Supreme Court Of California Approve Amendments To The Rules Of Professional Conduct Of The State Bar Of California, And Memorandum And Supporting Documents In Explanation,” December 1987.)

Rule 3-110 was last amended in 1992. (See page 13 of Supreme Court File No. 24408, “Request That The Supreme Court Of California Approve Amendments To The Rules
Of Professional Conduct Of The State Bar Of California, And Memorandum And Supporting Documents In Explanation," December 1991.) No substantive changes were made to paragraph (A) but the provision was stated more succinctly as: “A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.”

In paragraph (B), the phrase “to perform legal services competently” in the definition was reduced to a single word, “competence.” Also, the term “ability,” defined in the 1987 version of rule 3-110(C), was merged into the definition of competence.

B. ABA Model Rule 1.3 Diligence

Although the origin and history of Model Rule 1.3 was not the primary factor in the Commission’s consideration of proposed Rule 1.3, that information is published in “A Legislative History, The Development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1982 – 2013,” Art Garwin, Editor, 2013 American Bar Association, at pages 65 - 710, ISBN: 978-1-62722-385-0. (A copy of this excerpt is on file with the State Bar.)

VI. OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL / STATE BAR COURT COMMENTS

- Gregory Dresser, Office of Chief Trial Counsel, 9/27/2016
  (In response to 90-day public comment circulation):

  1. As discussed in OCTC’s comment to proposed Rule 1.1, OCTC is concerned with segregating and separating diligence, competence, and supervision into separate rules.

  Commission Response: The decision to separate diligence, competence and supervision into separate rules to enhance compliance and conform to the national standard remains valid and OCTC should not have any greater charging difficulties than bar regulators in other jurisdictions. Most of the comments we have received favor treating these duties in separate rules. Separating competence and diligence is also consistent with other rules. See, e.g., proposed Rule 1.7(b)(1).

  2. OCTC is concerned with Comments [1] and [2], because, as discussed, supervision of an attorney’s employees, office, and case is part of lawyer competence. Further, these Comments are unnecessary, even if those concepts are separated, because each rule explains what it covers.

  Commission Response: The Commission believes it is important to retain Comments [1] and [2], which provide cross-references to proposed Rules 5.1 to 5.6 (supervision rules) and proposed Rule 1.3 (competence rule), respectively. It is important to provide those references because those concepts had both previously been found within the competence rule.
• Gregory Dresser, Office of Chief Trial Counsel, 1/9/2017
(In response to 45-day public comment circulation):

1. OCTC is concerned with separating diligence, competence and supervision into separate rules. There has been no showing that the proposed changes are necessary to address developments in the law or because the current rule is inadequate to protect the public. Under the proposed new rules, California will have to develop new [case] law to distinguish among competence, diligence, and failure to supervise. It is noted the first Commission did not support distinguishing between competence and diligence.

   Commission Response: Separating the duty to act with reasonable diligence in a separate rule enhances public protection by providing greater uniformity and understanding as well as consistency with the rules in other jurisdictions. The distinction between competence and diligence is reflected in former rule 6-101. The Commission disagrees that new law will have to developed because the distinction among competence, diligence and the duty of supervision is already well developed in the law governing lawyers.

2. A failure to perform diligently is a failure to perform competently. The is because diligence is an essential part of competence. Moreover, distinguishing between competence and diligence is not always easy. The lines between these concepts are often blurry, unclear, and overlapping. These proposals will cause OCTC to file more charges against each respondent, i.e., OCTC will have to file three [competence, diligence, supervision] charges for what used to be one charge.

   Commission Response: Highlighting the concept of diligence as an important professional responsibility rather than it being subsumed within the competence rule promotes public protection and furthers the Commission’s charge in eliminating “unnecessary differences between California’s rules and the rules used by a preponderance of the states.” There is no reported history of charging or enforcement difficulties by having the duties of competence, diligence and supervision in separate rules. The distinction between these separate duties are well defined in the law and is not artificial.

3. OCTC is concerned with Comments [1] and [2] because these Comments are unnecessary, even if those concepts are separated, because each rule explains what is covered.

   Commission Response: The Commission believes Comments [1] and [2] are necessary to explain the rule and are comparable to Comments [1] and [2] in Rule 1.1 which the Board of Trustees previously approved.

• State Bar Court: No comments were received from State Bar Court.
VII. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS (INCLUDING COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL AND STATE BAR COURT) & PUBLIC HEARING TESTIMONY

During the 90-day public comment period, eight public comments were received. Four comments agreed with the proposed Rule, one comment disagreed, and three comments agreed only if modified. During the 45-day public comment period, three public comments were received. Two comments agreed with the proposed rule, and one comment disagreed with the proposed rule. Public comment synopsis tables, with the Commission's responses to each public comment, are provided at the end of this report.

VIII. RELATED CALIFORNIA LAW AND ABA MODEL RULEADOPTIONS

A. Related California Law

See Section V.A for a discussion of related California law. In addition to the foregoing, the Commission considered the following authorities:

• Business and Professions Code § 6128(b) (misdemeanor liability where attorney willfully delays a client's suit with a view to the attorney's own gain)
• Butler v. State Bar (1986) 42 Cal.3d 323, 328
• In the Matter of Hindin (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 657, 684
• In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 899]
• In the Matter of Layton (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366

B. ABA Model Rule Adoptions

The ABA Comparison Chart, entitled “Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3: Diligence,” revised September 15, 2016, is available at:

• http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_3.authcheckdam.pdf (Last accessed on 2/7/17.)
• Forty-two jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule 1.3 verbatim. Two jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 1.3. Two jurisdictions have not adopted a separate rule concerning diligence.


3 The seven jurisdictions are: Alabama, District of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Virginia.
IX. CONCEPTS ACCEPTED/REJECTED; CHANGES IN DUTIES; NON-SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES; ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

A. Concepts Accepted (Pros and Cons):

1. Recommend adoption of a standalone rule that addresses the concept of diligence rather than retain it as a component of the definition of diligence as in current rule 3-110(B).

   o Pros: There are a number of reasons for California addressing the duty of diligence in a separate, standalone rule:

   (1) Every jurisdiction, except California, has adopted Model Rule 1.3, has a variant of the rule that treats the duty of diligence separate and distinct from the duty of competence, or addresses diligence as a separate duty in its competence rule (Texas). California should do the same for purposes of clarity and consistency.

   (2) Although competence and diligence are often viewed together, they are distinct concepts of professional responsibility. The Model Rules and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provide that it is not enough to possess the capability to perform legal services with competence; a lawyer must employ these abilities diligently and not let the client's matter languish. See, e.g., Rest (3d) Law Governing Lawyers § 16, comment d.

   (3) As an example of point (3), competence requires that a lawyer have sufficient learning and skill to ascertain the applicable period of limitations; diligence requires that being aware of the period of limitations, the lawyer must not allow it to expire due the lawyer's neglect and inattention.

   (4) Both the Model Rules and the Restatement (as well as text books, ethics opinions and other resources) consistently refer to the lawyer's duty of competence and diligence separately. See, e.g., Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) (“the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client”); Rest. (3d) Law Governing Lawyers §16(2) (a lawyer must . . . “act with reasonable competence and diligence.”)

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4 The two jurisdictions are: California and Texas. Current rule 3-110(B) includes diligence as a component of the definition of “competence.” Texas Rule 1.1 (Competent and Diligent Representation) addresses diligence in a separate paragraph (b), which provides:

(b) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:

   (1) neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; or

   (2) frequently fail to carry out completely the obligations that the lawyer owes to a client or clients.
(5) Having a separate rule on the duty of diligence that includes a prohibition against undue delay provides needed public protection: “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented that procrastination... Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness.” Model Rule 1.3, Comment [3].

(6) California case law is consistent with the requirements of Model Rule 1.3. See Vapnek, et. al. CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (The Rutter Group. 2015) ¶¶ 6:92 ff.

(7) Having a separate rule on diligence will not materially increase the risk that lawyers will be disciplined for an act of simple negligence. Lack of dedication to a client's matter may be the basis for civil liability but it is not the same as a negligent act or omission under tort law. Rule 1.3 is concerned with indifference and lack of dedication in carrying out the obligations the lawyer has assumed and furthers the lawyer's fiduciary duty of loyalty to zealously represent the client and maintain the client's trust and confidence.

- **Cons**: There are several reasons not to adopt a standalone rule concerning diligence:

  (1) There is good advice in Model Rule 1.3 and in its Comments. As an example, Comment [3] begins: “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination.” However, to the extent that Rule 1.3 were to be applied to the quality of a lawyer's representation of a client, these lawyer's duties are well-understood as being part of current rule 3-110 and new Rule 1.1. Consequently, Rule 1.3 would amount only to advice about best practices and good client relations.

  (2) From a disciplinary standpoint, all that is needed is a rule that provides a basis for disciplining a lawyer whose tardiness causes client harm, and there already are two rules that serve that purpose.

The first is proposed Rule 1.1.

In addition, proposed Rule 1.16 [3-700] states the only bases on which a lawyer may terminate a lawyer-client relationship, so that a lack of diligence amounting to client abandonment also can violate proposed Rule 1.16 [3-700]. See, *e.g.*, *In the Matter of Doran*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 871, 1998 Calif. Op. LEXIS 6 (1998) (lawyer left a social security benefits hearing because he was “too upset” at a ruling to continue; the hearing went on in the lawyer’s absence; the client's claim was denied; lawyer found to have violated rules 3-110 and 3-700) and *In the Matter of Aulakh*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 690, 1997 Calif. Op. LEXIS 190 (1997) (lawyer held to have violated rules 3-110 and 3-700 for failing to pursue appeal, leading to a default, after having filed a notice or appearance).
(3) The harm in having a Rule 1.3 divorced from any client harm – as this proposed rule would be – is that it would create a standard for criticizing a lawyer that would be inconsistent with the duty of undivided loyalty to the client. Lawyers constantly and intentionally prioritize client needs based on a host of factors, including the lawyer’s personal life, and should not have to defend themselves when they have done so unless the lack of diligence creates client harm or violates a court order. A rule of that scope would go beyond any conduct that calls into question a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.

(4) Promptness and diligence should be retained where they are. The Restatement 3d of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 16, Reporter’s Note to Comment d treats diligence as being a component of competence and not a separate duty, as does current rule 3-110. This is the best resolution. Lawyers should aspire to be prompt, but that does not make it a proper subject of professional discipline.

2. Recommend adoption of a Comment that cross-references proposed Rule 1.1 [3-110], concerning a lawyer’s duty to provide competent representation.

   o **Pros:** In light of the duty of diligence being a component of the definition of “competence” in current rule 3-110(B), a cross-reference to that rule is appropriate.

   o **Cons:** None identified.

**B. Concepts Rejected (Pros and Cons):**

1. There were no concepts the Commission considered that were rejected. But see Section IX.E, below.

This section identifies concepts the Commission considered before the rule was circulated for public comment. Other concepts considered by the Commission, together with the Commission’s reasons for not recommending their inclusion in the rule, can be found in the Public Comment Synopsis Tables.

**C. Changes in Duties/Substantive Changes to the Current Rule or Other California Law:**

The Commission majority concluded that having a separate rule on diligence will not materially increase the risk that lawyers will be disciplined for an act of simple negligence. Lack of dedication to a client’s matter may be the basis for civil liability but it is not the same as a negligent act or omission under tort law. Rule 1.3 is concerned with indifference and lack of dedication in carrying out the obligations the lawyer has assumed and furthers the lawyer’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to zealously represent the client and maintain the client’s trust and confidence.

Those opposing the rule, on the other hand, take the position that proposed Rule 1.3 would create a novel standard that would move diligence as a requirement of the
standard of care and turn it into a duty to the legal system. By divorcing promptness and client harm, this Rule would create the opportunity for a lawyer to be disciplined, or for the lawyer’s conduct to be measured for civil purposes (such as in fee collection) by conduct that did not harm and might even have aided the client. Also from a civil standpoint, this Rule if adopted will be used to allege that each unexplained lawyer delay amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty.

D. Non-Substantive Changes to the Current Rule:

None.

E. Alternatives Considered:

The Commission considered but rejected a rule version that more closely aligned with Model Rule 1.3.

X. DISSENT/MINORITY STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY COMMISSION MEMBERS

Mr. Kehr submitted a written dissent. See attached for the full text of the dissent and the Commission’s response to the dissent.

XI. RECOMMENDATION AND PROPOSED BOARD RESOLUTION

Recommendation:

The Commission recommends adoption of proposed Rule 1.3 in the form attached to this Report and Recommendation.

Proposed Resolution:

RESOLVED: That the Board of Trustees adopts proposed Rule 1.3 in the form attached to this Report and Recommendation.
OCTC has explained in its detailed objection to proposed Rule 1.3 why creating a stand-alone diligence Rule, separating diligence from the duty of competence where it now and always has been, will cause needless problems for it. See, e.g., Budd v. Nixon, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200 (1971) (treating diligence as part of the standard of care). I believe that this proposed Rule suffers from defects that go beyond OCTC’s concerns.

Current rule 3-110 sets a standard for the quality of a lawyer’s representation of a client. The rule 3-110 focus is on client harm because competence is not an abstraction (that is why a lawyer can meet the competence standard by obtaining sufficient learning to do a job properly, even if the lawyer lacks needed skill when accepting an engagement).

Placing diligence in a separate Rule will lead to claims that a lawyer has violated the Rule by delaying a client’s work even in the absence of client harm. In fact, the delay might have been at the client’s request. An opposing party, to whom the lawyer owes no fiduciary duties, could threaten disciplinary action to try to motivate the lawyer and could claim that it was injured by delay. Any such threat or claim would conflict with the duty of undivided loyalty owed only to the client.

In Commission discussions, my concern was answered by saying that delay in general would be covered by proposed Rule 3.2, so proposed Rule 1.3 deals with client harm. This is not clear. Proposed Rule 3.2 by its terms deals only with litigation, and proposed Rule 1.3 says it applies “in representing a client.” That easily is read as a temporal limitation rather than a reference to client injury.

Two drafting points: First, it is not clear what is meant by “unduly delay” in proposed paragraph (b) (it presumably means something other than client injury or else there would be no need to separate diligence from the competence Rule, but is it something more than feel-good language?). Second, current rule 3-110 permits discipline for lack of competence that is intentional, reckless or repeated, and proposed Rule 1.1 follows this, only adding a standard of gross negligence because that phrase has been used in disciplinary cases (and is taken to mean the same as “reckless”). A single act of simple negligence does not suggest the lawyer is unfit to practice law and therefore never has served as the basis for professional discipline. Proposed Rule 1.3 repeats the standard of intentional, reckless, with gross negligence or repeated. Does this mean that two acts of negligence might satisfy either the Rule 1.1 standard, but the lawyer might not be subject to discipline if one is a lack of diligence coming under Rule 1.3?

Current rule 3-110 is not broken with respect to the need for diligence and does not need fixing. Proposed Rule 1.3 expresses a best practices concept. The application of the current rule is the subject of countless existing authorities and is free from doubt.

I respectfully dissent from proposed Rule 1.3 and would leave diligence in Rule 1.1.

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1 Rule 3.2 (“Delay of Litigation”) states: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to delay or prolong the proceeding or to cause needless expense.”
The Commission believes there are compelling reasons for having a separate rule on the duty of diligence. Both the Model Rules and the Restatement Third The Law Governing Lawyers (ALI 2000) as well as text books, ethics opinions and other resources consistently refer to the lawyer's duty of competence and diligence separately. See, e.g., Model Rule 1.7(b)(1); Restatement Third Law Governing Lawyers §16(2). Rule 1.3 is also consistent with the Commission's other proposed rules that refer to competence and diligence separately. See, e.g., proposed Rule 1.7(b)(1).

Every jurisdiction, except California and Texas, has adopted Model Rule 1.3 or has a variant of the rule that treats the duty of diligence separate and distinct from the duty of competence. Texas addresses diligence as a separate duty in its competence rule. Having a separate rule on the duty to act with reasonable diligence is consistent with the national standard and will enhance public protection and provide greater uniformity and understanding.

Rule 1.3 underscores that lawyers have a professional responsibility to be both competent and to act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client. The law provides that it is not enough to possess the capability to perform legal services with competence; a lawyer must employ these abilities diligently and not let the client's matter languish. See, e.g., Restatement Third Law Governing Lawyers §16, Comment d.

The dissenter is incorrect that diligence has always been subsumed with competence. California previously treated diligence in a separate paragraph (2) in former Rule 6-101 (1975-1983). Allowing the rules to continue to conflate competence and diligence would serve only to confuse lawyers about these separate and distinct obligations and result in less public protection. Proposed Rule 1.3 is consistent California case law. See Vapnek, et. al. California Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The Rutter Group. 2015) ¶¶. 6:92 ff.

The dissenter contends that the proposed Rule creates a standard for discipline that conflicts with the duty of undivided loyalty to the client. This has not been an issue, however, with ABA Model Rule 1.3 and the many states that have adopted it. Moreover, the language of the proposed Rule is not correctly read as creating any duty that would conflict with an attorney's duty of loyalty to the client. Paragraph (b) ties the neglect, disregard, or undue delay that would violate the Rule to "commitment and dedication to the interests of the client." Only where undue delay intrudes on commitment and dedication to client interests (which may occur even where there is no direct harm to the client's interests and the delay causes only needless anxiety to the client) would Rule 1.3 subject the attorney to discipline.

The problems the dissenter perceives in having a separate rule defining the lawyer's duty of diligence have simply not materialized in the 35 years Rule 1.3 has been in existence. It has not been shown, for example, that Rule 1.3 results in claims of delay
by opposing counsel or creates confusion between the duty not to neglect the client's matter with the duty to reasonably expedite litigation. (See proposed Rule 3.2).

Having a separate rule on the duty of diligence provides needed public protection: “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination . . . . Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness.” Model Rule 1.3, Comment [3].