BOARD AGENDA ITEM NOV 132

PROPOSED NEW AND AMENDED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA -- BATCHES 1, 2, & 3

(Adopted by the Board Committee on Regulation and Admissions November 12, 2009.)*
(Adopted by the Board of Governors _____, 2009.)*

* The Board of Governor's adoption of the proposed rules is subject to consideration of possible revisions following a comprehensive public comment distribution of the entire body of proposed rules.

Rule 1.0 Purpose and Scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) Purpose: The purposes of the following Rules are:

(1) To protect the public;

(2) To protect the interests of clients;

(3) To protect the integrity of the legal system and to promote the administration of justice; and

(4) To promote respect for, and confidence in, the legal profession.

(b) Scope of the Rules:

(1) These Rules, together with any standards adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California pursuant to these Rules, regulate the conduct of lawyers and are binding upon all members of the State Bar and all other lawyers practicing law in this state.

(2) A willful violation of these Rules is a basis for discipline.

(3) Nothing in these Rules or the comments to the Rules is intended to enlarge or to restrict the law regarding the liability of lawyers to others.

(c) Comments: The comments following the Rules do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for their interpretation and for acting in compliance with the Rules.

(d) Title: These Rules are the "California Rules of Professional Conduct."

COMMENT

[1] The Rules of Professional Conduct are Rules of the Supreme Court of California regulating lawyer conduct in this state. (See *In re Attorney Discipline System* (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 582, 593-597 [79 Cal Rptr.2d 836]; *Howard v. Babcock* (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 409, 418 [25 Cal Rptr.2d 80]. The Rules have been adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California and approved by the Supreme Court pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6076 and 6077. The Supreme Court of California has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in California, including the power to admit and discipline lawyers practicing in this jurisdiction. (*Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 329, 336 [178 Cal.Rptr. 801]; *Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Association v. Woodside* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 542-543 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617] and see Business and Professions Code section 6100.)

[2] The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through discipline. (See *Ames v. State Bar* (1973) 8 Cal.3d 910 [106 Cal.Rptr. 489].) Therefore, failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. Because the Rules are not designed to be a basis for civil liability, a violation of a rule does not itself give rise to a cause of action for enforcement of a rule or for damages caused by failure to comply with the rule. (*Stanley v. Richmond* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1097 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 768]; *Noble v. Sears Roebuck & Co.* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 654, 658 [109 Cal.Rptr. 269]; *Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell* (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1333 [231 Cal.Rptr. 355].) Nevertheless, a lawyer's

violation of a rule may be evidence of breach of a lawyer's fiduciary or other substantive legal duty in a non-disciplinary context. (See, *Stanley v. Richmond, supra*, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086; *Mirabito v. Liccardo* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 41, 44 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 571].) A violation of the rule may have other non-disciplinary consequences. (See e.g., *Klemm v. Superior Court* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 893 [142 Cal.Rptr. 509] (disqualification); *Academy of California Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 999 [124 Cal.Rptr. 668] (duty to return client files); *Fletcher v. Davis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 61 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 58] (enforcement of attorney's lien); *Chambers v. Kay* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 536] (enforcement of fee sharing agreement); *Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc.* (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597 [168 Cal.Rptr. 196] (communication with represented party).)

[3] These Rules are not the sole basis of lawyer regulation. Lawyers authorized to practice law in California are also bound by applicable law including the State Bar Act (Business and Professions Code section 6000 et. seq.), other statutes, rules of court, and the opinions of California courts. Although not binding, issued opinions of ethics committees in California should be consulted for guidance on proper professional conduct. Ethics opinions of other bar associations may also be considered to the extent they relate to rules and laws that are consistent with the rules and laws of this state.

[4] Under paragraph (b)(2), a willful violation of a rule does not require that the lawyer intend to violate the rule. (*Phillips v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 944, 952 [264 Cal.Rptr. 346]; and see Business and Professions Code section 6077.)

[5] For the disciplinary authority of this state and choice of law, see Rule 8.5.

Rule 1.1 Competence
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence

(b) For purposes of this Rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.

(c) If a lawyer does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal services are undertaken, the lawyer may nonetheless provide competent representation by 1) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be competent, 2) acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required, or 3) referring the matter to another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be competent.

COMMENT

[1] It is the duty of every lawyer to provide competent legal services to the client.

[2] Competence under paragraph (b) includes the obligation to act with reasonable diligence on behalf of a client. This includes pursuing a matter on behalf of a client by taking lawful and ethical measures required to advance the client's cause or objectives. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy on the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rules [1.2] and 1.4. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

[3] It is a violation of this Rule if a lawyer accepts employment or continues representation in a matter as to which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer does not have, or will not acquire before performance is required, sufficient time, resources, and ability to perform the legal services with competence. It is also a violation of this Rule if a lawyer repeatedly accepts employment or continues representation in a matter when the lawyer does not have, or will not acquire before performance is required, sufficient time, resources, and ability to perform the legal services with competence.

[4] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

[5] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This provision applies to lawyers generally, including a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. [See also Rule 6.2]

[6] This Rule is not intended to apply to a single act of negligent conduct or a single mistake in a particular matter.

[7] This Rule addresses only a lawyer's responsibility for his or her own professional competence. See Rules 5.1(b) and 5.3 (b) with respect to a lawyer's disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

Rule 1.4 Communication
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which written disclosure or the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules or the State Bar Act;

(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which to accomplish the client's objectives in the representation;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about significant developments relating to the representation;

(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;

(5) promptly comply with reasonable client requests for access to significant documents necessary to keep the client reasonably informed about significant developments relating to the representation, which the lawyer may satisfy by permitting the client to inspect the documents or by furnishing copies of the documents to the client; and

(6) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by these Rules or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c) A lawyer shall promptly communicate to the lawyer's client:

(1) all terms and conditions of any offer made to the client in a criminal matter; and

(2) all amounts, terms, and conditions of any written offer of settlement made to the client in all other matters.

COMMENT

[1] Whether a particular development is significant will generally depend upon the surrounding facts and circumstances. For example, a change in lawyer personnel might be a significant development depending on whether responsibility for overseeing the client's work is being changed, whether the new attorney will be performing a significant portion or aspect of the work, and whether staffing is being changed from what was promised to the client. Other examples of significant developments may include the receipt of a demand for further discovery or a threat of sanctions, a change in a criminal abstract of judgment or re-calculation of custody credits, and the loss or theft of information concerning the client's identity or information concerning the matter for which representation is being provided. Depending upon the circumstances, a lawyer may also be obligated pursuant to paragraphs (a)(2) or (a)(3) to communicate with the client concerning the opportunity to engage in, and the advantages and disadvantages of, alternative dispute resolution processes. Conversely, examples of developments or circumstances that generally are not significant include the payment of a motion fee and

the application for or granting of an extension of time for a time period that does not materially prejudice the client's interest.

[2] A lawyer may comply with paragraph (a)(5) by providing to the client copies of significant documents by electronic or other means. A lawyer may agree with the client that the client assumes responsibility for the cost of copying significant documents the lawyer provides pursuant to paragraph (a)(5). A lawyer must comply with paragraph (a)(5) without regard to whether the client has complied with an obligation to pay the lawyer's fees and costs. This Rule is not intended to prohibit a claim for the recovery of the member's expense in any subsequent legal proceeding.

[3] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so.

[4] As used in paragraph (c), "client" includes a person who possesses the authority to accept an offer of settlement or plea, or, in a class action, all the named representatives of the class.

[5] Because of the liberty interests involved in a criminal matter, paragraph (c)(1) requires that counsel in a criminal matter convey to the client all offers, whether written or oral. As used in this Rule, "criminal matters" includes all legal proceedings where violations of criminal laws are alleged, and liberty interests are involved, including juvenile proceedings.

[6] Paragraph (c)(2) requires a lawyer to advise a client promptly of all written settlement offers, regardless of whether the offers are considered by the lawyer to be significant. Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer need not inform the client of the substance of a written offer of a settlement in a civil matter if the client has previously instructed that such an offer will be acceptable or unacceptable, or has previously authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer, and there has been no change in circumstances that requires the lawyer to consult with the client. See Rule [1.2(a)].

[7] Any oral offers of settlement made to the client in a civil matter must also be communicated if they are significant.

[8] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

[9] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying or withholding transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. For example, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. This Rule does not require a lawyer to disclose to a client any information or document that a court order or non-disclosure

agreement prohibits the lawyer from disclosing to that client. This Rule is not intended to override applicable statutory or decisional law requiring that certain information not be provided to defendants in criminal cases who are clients of the lawyer. Compare Rule [1.16(e)(1) and Comment [9]].

[10] This Rule is not intended to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate any application of the work product rule. The obligation of the lawyer to provide work product to the client shall be governed by relevant statutory and decisional law.

Rule 1.5: Fees for Legal Services
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unconscionable or illegal fee or an unconscionable or illegal in-house expense.

(b) A fee is unconscionable under this Rule if it is so exorbitant and wholly disproportionate to the services performed as to shock the conscience; or if the lawyer, in negotiating or setting the fee, has engaged in fraudulent conduct or overreaching, so that the fee charged, under the circumstances, constitutes or would constitute an improper appropriation of the client's funds. Unconscionability of a fee shall be determined on the basis of all the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement is entered into except where the parties contemplate that the fee will be affected by later events.

(c) Among the factors to be considered, where appropriate, in determining the conscionability of a fee or in-house expense are the following:

(1) the amount of the fee or in-house expense in proportion to the value of the services performed;

(2) the relative sophistication of the lawyer and the client;

(3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(4) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(5) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(6) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(7) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(8) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;

(9) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(10) the time and labor required;

(11) whether the client gave informed consent to the fee or in-house expense.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a family law matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or declaration of nullity of a marriage or upon the amount of spousal or child support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

(e) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect a non-refundable fee, except:

(1) a lawyer may charge a true retainer, which is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to ensure the lawyer's availability to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed. A true retainer must be agreed to in a writing signed by the client. Unless otherwise agreed, a true retainer is the lawyer's property on receipt.

(2) a lawyer may charge a flat fee for specified legal services, which constitutes complete payment for those services and may be paid in whole or in part in advance of the lawyer providing the services. If agreed to in advance in a writing signed by the client, a flat fee is the lawyer's property on receipt. The written fee agreement shall, in a manner that can easily be understood by the client, include the following: (i) the scope of the services to be provided; (ii) the total amount of the fee and the terms of payment; (iii) that the fee is the lawyer's property immediately on receipt; (iv) that the fee agreement does not alter the client's right to terminate the client-lawyer relationship; and (v) that the client may be entitled to a refund of a portion of the fee if the agreed-upon legal services have not been completed.

COMMENT

Unconscionability of Fee

[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are not unconscionable or illegal under the circumstances. An illegal fee can result from a variety of circumstances, including when a lawyer renders services under a fee agreement that is unenforceable as illegal or against public policy, (e.g., *Kallen v. Delug* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 940, 950-951 [203 Cal.Rptr. 879] [fee agreement with other lawyer entered under threat of withholding client file]), when a lawyer contracts for or collects a fee that exceeds statutory limits (e.g., *In re Shalant* (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 829; *In re Harney* (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 266 [fees exceeding limits under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6146]), or when an unlicensed lawyer provides legal services. (e.g., *Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon and Frank v. Superior Court* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 119, 136 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 304]; *In re Wells* (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 896.) Paragraph (b) defines an unconscionable fee. (See *Herrscher v. State Bar* (1934) 4 Cal.2d 399, 402 [49 P.2d 832]; *Goldstone v. State Bar* (1931) 214 Cal. 490 [6 P.2d 513].) The factors specified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (11) that are to be considered in determining whether a fee is conscionable are not exclusive. Nor will each factor necessarily be relevant in each instance. Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the unconscionability standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In-house expenses are charges by the lawyer or firm as opposed to third-party charges.

Basis or Rate of Fee

[2] In many circumstances, Business and Professions Code, sections 6147 and 6148 govern what a lawyer is required to include in a fee agreement, and provide consequences for a lawyer's failure to comply with the requirements. (See, e.g., *In re Harney* (1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 266.)

[3] With respect to modifications to the basis or rate of a fee after the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship, see Rule 1.8.1, Comments [5], [6].

Terms of Payment

[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee but is obliged to return any unearned portion. (See Rule [1.16(e)(2)]) A fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8.1.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay.

Prohibited Contingent Fees

[6] Paragraph (d)(1) does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of balances past due under child or spousal support or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.

Payment of Fees in Advance of Services

[7] Every fee agreed to, charged, or collected, including a fee that is a lawyer's property on receipt under paragraph (e)(1) or (e)(2), is subject to Rule 1.5(a) and may not be unconscionable.

[8] Paragraph (e)(1) describes a true retainer, which is sometimes known as a "general retainer," or "classic retainer." A true retainer secures availability alone, that is, it presumes that the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for any actual work performed. Therefore, a payment purportedly made to secure a lawyer's availability, but that will be applied to the client's account as the lawyer renders services, is not a true retainer under paragraph (e)(1). The written true retainer agreement should specify the time period or purpose of the lawyer's availability, that the client will be separately charged for any services provided, and that the lawyer will treat the payment as the lawyer's property immediately on receipt.

[9] Paragraph (e)(2) describes a fee structure that is known as a "flat fee". A flat fee constitutes complete payment for specified legal services, and does not vary with the amount of time or effort the lawyer expends to perform or complete the specified services. If the requirements of paragraph (f)(2) are not met, a flat fee received in advance must be treated as an advance for fees. See Rule 1.15.

[10] If a lawyer and a client agree to a true retainer under paragraph (e)(1) or a flat fee under paragraph (e)(2) and the lawyer complies with all applicable requirements, the fee is considered the lawyer's property on receipt and must not be deposited into a client trust account. See Rule 1.15(f). For definitions of the terms "writing" and "signed," see Rule 1.0.1(n).

[11] When a lawyer-client relationship terminates, the lawyer must refund the unearned portion of a fee. See Rule 1.16(e)(2). In the event of a dispute relating to a fee under paragraph (e)(1) or (e)(2) of this Rule, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.15(d)(2).

Division of Fee

[12] A division of fees among lawyers is governed by Rule 1.5.1.

Rule 1.5.1: Financial Arrangements Among Lawyers
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) Lawyers who are not in the same law firm shall not divide a fee for legal services unless:

(1) The lawyers enter into a written agreement to divide the fee;

(2) The client has consented in writing, either at the time the lawyers enter into the agreement to divide the fee or as soon thereafter as reasonably practicable, after a full written disclosure to the client that a division of fees will be made, the identity of the lawyers who are parties to the division, and the terms of the division; and

(3) The total fee charged by all lawyers is not increased solely by reason of the agreement to divide fees.

COMMENT

[1] A division of a fee under paragraph (a) occurs when a lawyer pays to a lawyer who is not in the same law firm a portion of specific fees paid by a client. For a discussion of criteria for determining whether a division of a fee under paragraph (a) has occurred, see *Chambers v. Kay* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142 [126 Cal.Rptr.2 536].

[2] Paragraph (a) applies to referral fees in which a lawyer, who does not work on the client's matter, receives a portion of any fee paid to another lawyer who is not in the same law firm. Paragraph (a) is also intended to apply to a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same law firm but who are working jointly for a client.

[3] Paragraph (a) requires both the lawyer dividing the fee and the lawyer receiving the division to comply with the requirements of the Rule.

[4] Paragraph (a)(2) requires lawyers to make full disclosure to the client and to obtain the client's written consent when the lawyers enter into the agreement to divide the fee in order to address matters that may be of concern to the client and that may not be addressed adequately later in the engagement. These concerns may include 1) whether the client is actually retaining a lawyer appropriate for the client's matter or whether the lawyer's involvement is based on the lawyer's agreement to divide the fee; 2) whether the lawyer dividing the fee will devote sufficient time to the matter in light of the fact that the lawyer will be receiving a reduced fee; and 3) whether the client may prefer to negotiate a more favorable arrangement directly with the lawyer dividing the fee.

[5] This Rule does not apply to a division of fees pursuant to court order.

[6] This Rule does not subject a lawyer to discipline unless the lawyer actually pays the divided fee to a lawyer who is not in the same law firm without having complied with the requirements in paragraph (a).

[7] Under Rule 1.5, a lawyer cannot enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee. Under Rule 1.5 a lawyer cannot divide or enter into an agreement to divide an illegal or unconscionable fee.

Rule 1.8.3 Gifts From Client

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) induce or solicit a client to make a substantial gift, including a testamentary gift, to the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer, or

(2) prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift, unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client.

(b) For purposes of this Rule, related persons include "a person who is related by blood or marriage" as that term is defined in Cal. Probate Code, section 21350(b).

COMMENT

[1] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from persuading or influencing a client to give the lawyer any gift of more than nominal market value, except where the lawyer is related to the client. However, a lawyer does not violate this Rule merely by engaging in conduct that might result in a client making a gift, such as by sending the client a wedding announcement. Discipline is appropriate where impermissible influence occurs. (See *Magee v. State Bar* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 423 [24 Cal.Rptr. 839].)

[2] If effecting a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, the client must have independent representation by another lawyer in accordance with Probate Code, sections 21350 et seq. The sole exception is where the client is a relative of the donee.

[3] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provisions in Rule 1.7(d). In disclosing the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

Rule 1.8.5 Payment of Personal or Business Expenses Incurred by or for a Client

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly pay or agree to pay, guarantee, or represent that the lawyer or lawyer's law firm will pay the personal or business expenses of a prospective or existing client, except that a lawyer may:

(1) pay or agree to pay such expenses to third persons, from funds collected or to be collected for the client as a result of the representation, with the consent of the client;

(2) after the lawyer is retained by the client, agree to lend money to the client based on the client's written promise to repay the loan, provided the lawyer complies with Rule 1.8.1 before making the loan or agreeing to do so;

(3) advance the costs of prosecuting or defending a claim or action, or of otherwise protecting or promoting the client's interests, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter. "Costs" within the meaning of this paragraph (a)(3) are limited to all reasonable expenses of litigation, including court costs, and reasonable expenses in preparing for litigation or in providing other legal services to the client; and

(4) pay court costs and reasonable expenses of litigation on behalf of an indigent or pro bono client in a matter in which the lawyer represents the client.

(b) A lawyer does not violate this rule by offering or giving a gift to a current client, provided that anything given was not offered in consideration of any promise, agreement, or understanding that the lawyer would make a gift to the client.

Comment

[1] This Rule is intended to balance two competing concerns. One is that a lawyer's subsidization of a client's legal proceedings would give the lawyer a financial stake in the proceedings that might injuriously affect the performance of the duties owed to the client, including the obligation to exercise independent professional judgment on the client's behalf without being influenced by the lawyer's personal interests. The second concern is that a prohibition on the lawyer providing financial assistance to the client might adversely affect the client's access to justice. The Rule is also intended to protect against the hidden transfer of funds to a client under the guise of a loan and to protect the lawyer against client demands for loans or gifts.

[2] Paragraph (a)(2) does not permit a lawyer to lend money, or to offer, promise or agree to lend money, to a prospective client. It does permit a lawyer to lend money to a client after the lawyer is retained, but the lawyer then must comply with Rule 1.8.1 and make a disclosure under Rule 1.7(d)(4) concerning the effect the proposed agreement might have on the lawyer's representation of the client. Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to limit the application of Rule 1.8.12.

[3] "Costs," as defined in paragraph (a)(3), are not limited to those that are taxable or recoverable under any applicable statute or rule of court.

Rule 1.8.8 [3-400] Limiting Liability to Client
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

A lawyer shall not:

(a) Contract with a client prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to the client for the lawyer's professional malpractice; or

(b) Settle a claim or potential claim for the lawyer's liability to a client or former client for the lawyer's professional malpractice, unless the client or former client is either:

(1) represented by independent counsel concerning the settlement; or

(2) advised in writing by the lawyer to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice regarding the settlement and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice.

COMMENT

[1] This Rule precludes a lawyer from taking unfair advantage of a client or former client in settling a claim or potential claim for malpractice.

[2] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims. See, e.g., *Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 261]; *Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1501 [256 Cal.Rptr. 6]. Nor does this Rule limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity.

[3] Paragraph (b) is not intended to override obligations the lawyer may have under other law. See, e.g., Business and Professions Code § 6090.5.

[4] This Rule does not apply to customary qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and memoranda, nor does it prevent a lawyer from reasonably limiting the scope of the lawyer's representation. (See Rule 1.2.)

Rule 1.8.12 Purchasing Property at a Foreclosure or a Sale Subject to Judicial Review
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly purchase property at a foreclosure, receiver's, trustee's, or judicial sale in an action or proceeding in which such lawyer or any lawyer affiliated with that lawyer's law firm is acting as a lawyer for a party or as executor, receiver, trustee, administrator, guardian or conservator.

(b) A lawyer shall not represent the seller at a foreclosure, receiver's, trustee's, or judicial sale in which the purchaser is a spouse, relative or other close associate of the lawyer or of another lawyer in the lawyer's law firm.

(c) This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer's participation in transactions that are specifically authorized by and comply with Probate Code sections 9880 through 9885; but such transactions remain subject to the provisions of Rules 1.8.1 [3-300] and 1.7 [3-310].

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer may lawfully participate in a transaction involving a probate proceeding which concerns a client by following the process described in Probate Code sections 9880 - 9885. These provisions, which permit what would otherwise be impermissible self-dealing by specific submissions to and approval by the courts, must be strictly followed in order to avoid violation of this Rule.

Rule 1.13 Organization as Client
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization shall conform his or her representation to the concept that the client is the organization itself, acting through its duly authorized constituents overseeing the particular engagement.

(b) If a lawyer representing an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is acting, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation in a manner that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is (i) a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization, and (ii) likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best lawful interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best lawful interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

(c) In taking any action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer shall not violate his or her duty of protecting all confidential information as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1).

(d) If, despite the lawyer's actions in accordance with paragraph (b), the officer, employee or other person insists upon action, or fails to act, in a manner that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization or a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall continue to proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best lawful interests of the organization. The lawyer's response may include the lawyer's right and, where appropriate, duty to resign or withdraw in accordance with Rule 1.16.

(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b), or who resigns or withdraws under circumstances described in paragraph (d), shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer representing the organization shall explain the identity of the lawyer's client whenever the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituent(s) with whom the lawyer is dealing.

(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rules 1.7, 1.8.2, 1.8.6, and 1.8.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by any of these Rules, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official or body of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

COMMENT

The Entity as the Client

[1] This Rule applies to all forms of legal organizations such as corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, and incorporated and unincorporated associations. This Rule also applies to governmental organizations. See Comment [13]. An organizational client cannot act except through individuals who are authorized to conduct its affairs. The identity of an organization's constituents will depend on its form, structure, and chosen terminology. For example, in the case of a corporation, constituents include officers, directors, employees and shareholders. In the case of other organizational forms, constituents include the equivalents of officers, directors, employees, and shareholders. Any agent or fiduciary authorized to act on behalf of an organization is a constituent of the organization for purposes of the authorized matter.

[2] When a lawyer is retained by an organization, the lawyer is required to take direction from and communicate with the constituent(s) authorized by the organization or by law to instruct or communicate with the lawyer with respect to the matter for which the organization has retained the lawyer.

[3] When a constituent of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that constituent's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1). Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6 and section 6068(e)(1). This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except as permitted by Rule 1.6 or by section 6068(e).

[4] When constituents of an organization make decisions for it, a lawyer ordinarily must accept those decisions even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. It is not within the lawyer's province to make decisions on behalf of the organization concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk. A lawyer, however, has a duty to inform the client of significant developments related to the representation under Rule 1.4 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(m). Paragraph (b) involves one aspect of that duty. It applies when a lawyer knows that an officer or other constituent of the organization intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know (i) violates a legal obligation to the organization or is a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization, and (ii) is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization. In those circumstances, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best lawful interest of the organization.

[5] Paragraph (b) applies when a lawyer knows that an officer or other constituent of the organization intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in the conduct. Under this knowledge standard, a lawyer is not required to audit the client's activities or initiate an investigation to uncover the existence of such conduct. Nevertheless, knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. See Rule 1.0.1(f).

[6] Paragraph (b) distinguishes between knowledge of the conduct and knowledge of the consequences of that conduct. When a lawyer knows of the conduct, the lawyer's obligations under paragraph (b) are triggered when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the conduct is (i) a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization, and (ii) likely to result in substantial injury to the organization. The "knows or reasonably should know" standard requires the lawyer to engage in the level of analysis that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would undertake to ascertain whether the conduct meets the criteria that trigger the lawyer's obligations under paragraph (b).

[7] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its potential consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. For example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. For the responsibility of a subordinate lawyer in representing an organization, see Rule 5.2.

[8] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that, when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

[9] Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated to proceed in accordance with paragraph (b), a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. For example, if a lawyer acting on behalf of an organizational client knows that an actual or apparent agent of the organization acts or intends or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation in a manner that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is a violation of a legal duty to the organization or a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization, but the lawyer does not know or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, paragraph (b) does not apply. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, subject to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1), the lawyer may take such actions as appear to the lawyer to be in the best lawful interest of the organization. Such actions may include among others (i) urging reconsideration of the matter while

explaining its likely consequences to the organization; or (ii) referring the matter to a higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, to the highest authority, as determined by applicable law, that can act on behalf of the organization.

[10] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b), or who resigns or withdraws under circumstances described in paragraph (d), must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal and the reason for the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

[11] Proceeding in the best lawful interest of the organization under this Rule does not authorize a lawyer to substitute the lawyer's judgment for that of the organization or to take action on behalf of the organization independently of the direction the lawyer receives from the highest authorized constituent overseeing the particular engagement. In determining how to proceed in the best lawful interests of the organization, a lawyer should consider the extent to which the organization should be informed of the circumstances, the actions taken by the organization with respect to the matter and the direction the lawyer has received from the organizational client.

Relation to Other Rules

[12] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.4, 1.6, 1.16, 3.3, [4.1], or the 1.8 series of Rules.

[13] Absent circumstances that would require withdrawal under paragraph (d), the lawyer may continue to represent an organizational client if, despite the lawyer's actions under paragraph (b), the constituent continues to insist on or continues to act or refuse to act in a manner that triggers the application of paragraph (b). Paragraph (d) confirms that a lawyer may not withdraw from representing an organization unless the lawyer is permitted or required to do so under Rule 1.16. Where the lawyer continues to represent the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best lawful interests of the organization, including continuing to urge reconsideration, where appropriate. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event the lawyer may be required to withdraw from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1).

Governmental Organizations

[14] In representing governmental organizations, it may be more difficult to define precisely the identity of the client and the lawyer's obligations. However, those matters are beyond the scope of these Rules. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by

the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulations. This Rule does not limit that authority.

[15] Although this Rule does not authorize a governmental organization's lawyer to act as a whistle-blower in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1) or Rule 1.6, a governmental organization has the option of establishing internal organizational rules and procedures that identify an official, agency, organization, or other person to serve as the designated recipient of whistle-blower reports from the organization's lawyers.

Clarifying the Lawyer's Role

[16] There are times when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents or when the constituent with whom the lawyer is communicating mistakenly believes that the lawyer has formed a lawyer-client relationship with that constituent. Under paragraph (f), in such circumstances the lawyer must not mislead the constituent into believing that a lawyer-client relationship exists between the lawyer and the constituent when such is not the case and shall make a reasonable effort to correct a constituent's mistaken belief in that regard. In such circumstances, the lawyer must advise the constituent that the lawyer does not represent the constituent and that communications between the lawyer and the constituent are not confidential as to the organization and may be disclosed to the organization or used for the benefit of the organization. See Rule 4.3

Dual Representation

[17] Paragraph (g) allows lawyers to represent both an organization and a constituent of an organization in the same matter, so long as the lawyer complies with these Rules, including Rules 1.7, 1.8.2, 1.8.6, and 1.8.7. Paragraph (g) requires that the organization's consent to dual representation of the organization and a constituent of the organization must be provided by someone other than the constituent who is to be represented. When there is no appropriate official of the organization to provide consent and the appropriate body of the organization is deadlocked, consent may be given by the shareholders of the organization to the extent allowed by law or by the rules or regulations governing the conduct of the organization's affairs. When there is no appropriate official, body or ownership group that can consent for the organization, the constituent to be represented in the dual representation may provide such consent in some cases. As used in this Rule, "shareholder" includes shareholders of a corporation, members of an association or limited liability company, or partners in a partnership.

[18] This Rule does not prohibit lawyers from representing both an organization and a constituent of an organization in separate matters, so long as the lawyer has addressed the conflicts of interest that may arise. In dealing with a close corporation or small association, lawyers commonly perform professional engagements for both the organization and its major constituents. When a change in control occurs or is threatened, a lawyer's duties as counsel for the organization may preclude the lawyer from representing the organization's constituents in matters related to control of the organization. In resolving such multiple relationships, lawyers must rely on case law. (See *Goldstein v. Lees* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614 [120 Cal.Rptr. 253]; *Woods v.*

Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 [197 Cal.Rptr. 185]; *In re Banks* (1978) 283 Ore. 459 [584 P.2d 284]; 1 A.L.R.4th 1105.) Similar issues can arise in a derivative action. (See *Forrest v. Baeza* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 65 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 857].)

Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the representation will result in violation of these Rules or of the State Bar Act;

(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client competently; or

(3) the client discharges the lawyer.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:

(1) the client insists upon presenting a claim or defense in litigation, or asserting a position or making a demand in a non-litigation matter, that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;

(2) the client either seeks to pursue a criminal or fraudulent course of conduct or has used the lawyer's services to advance a course of conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes was a crime or fraud;

(3) the client insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is criminal or fraudulent;

(4) the client by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out the employment effectively;

(5) the client breaches a material term of an agreement with or obligation to the lawyer relating to the representation, and the lawyer has given the client a reasonable warning after the breach that the lawyer will withdraw unless the client fulfills the agreement or performs the obligation;

(6) the client knowingly and freely assents to termination of the representation;

(7) the lawyer believes in good faith that the inability to work with co-counsel makes it in the best interests of the client to withdraw from the representation;

(8) the lawyer's mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the lawyer to carry out the employment effectively;

(9) a continuation of the representation is likely to result in a violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act; or

(10) the lawyer believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal.

(c) If permission for termination of a representation is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not terminate a representation before that tribunal without its permission.

(d) A lawyer shall not terminate a representation until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, such as giving the client sufficient notice to permit the client to retain other counsel, and complying with paragraph (e).

(e) Upon the termination of a representation for any reason:

(1) Subject to any applicable protective order, non-disclosure agreement or statutory limitation, the lawyer promptly shall release to the client, at the request of the client, all client materials and property. "Client materials and property" includes correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, experts' reports and other writings, exhibits, and physical evidence, whether in tangible, electronic or other form, and other items reasonably necessary to the client's representation, whether the client has paid for them or not; and

(2) The lawyer promptly shall refund any part of a fee or expense paid in advance that the lawyer has not earned or incurred. This provision is not applicable to a true retainer fee paid solely for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the lawyer for the matter.

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer should not accept a representation unless the lawyer reasonably believes the lawyer can complete the representation in compliance with these Rules and the State Bar Act. A lawyer has the obligation or option to withdraw only in the circumstances and only in the manner described in this Rule. This requirement applies, without limitation, to any sale under Rule 1.17. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. (See Rules [1.2(c)] and [6.5].) A lawyer can be subject to discipline for improperly threatening to terminate a representation. See *Matter of Shalant*, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 829 (2005).

Mandatory Withdrawal

[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that would violate these Rules or the State Bar Act. The references to these Rules and to the State Bar Act in paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(3) reflect the primacy of the lawyer's duties, for example, under Business and Professions Code sections 6067, 6068, 6103, and 6106. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client might make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. Depending on the circumstances, when the client's conduct permits the lawyer to withdraw, or to seek permission to withdraw where that is required, the lawyer might consider counseling the client regarding the client's conduct, limiting the scope of the representation, or aiding the client in rectifying the client's prior conduct. (See Rules 1.2(c) and 1.4.)

[3] [When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. (See also Rule 6.2.)]

[4] A lawyer is not subject to discipline for withdrawing under paragraph (a)(1) or (2) if the lawyer has acted reasonably under the facts and circumstances known to the lawyer, even if that belief later is shown to have been wrong.

Optional Withdrawal

[5] Paragraph (b)(2) permits a lawyer to withdraw from a representation even if the lawyer is not asked to participate in or further a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct. Even when a withdrawal is in these circumstances, the lawyer must comply with his or her duties under Business and Professions Code, section 6068(e)(1) and [Rule 1.6].

[6] Paragraph (b)(5) allows a lawyer to withdraw from a representation if the client refuses to abide by a material term of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees, court costs or other expenses, or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

Permission to Withdraw

[7] Lawyers must comply with their obligations to their clients under [Rule 1.6] and to the courts under [Rule 3.3] when seeking permission to withdraw under paragraph (c). If a tribunal denies a lawyer permission to withdraw, the lawyer is obligated to comply with the tribunal's order. (See Business and Professions Code sections 6068(b), and 6103.) This duty applies even if the lawyer sought permission to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. Regarding withdrawal from limited scope representations that involve court appearances, compliance with Rules 3.36 and 5.71 of the California Rules of Court satisfies paragraph (c).

Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal

[8] Paragraph (d) requires the lawyer to take "reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client." These steps will vary according to the circumstances. Absent special circumstances, "reasonable steps" do not include providing additional services to the client once the successor counsel has been employed and the lawyer has satisfied paragraph (e). The lawyer must satisfy paragraph (d) even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client.

[9] Paragraph (e) states a lawyer's duties when, after termination of a representation for any reason, new counsel seeks to obtain client files from the lawyer. It applies to client papers and property held by a lawyer in any form or format and codifies existing case law. (See *Academy of California Optometrists v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 999 [124 Cal.Rptr. 668]; *Weiss v. Marcus* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590 [124 Cal.Rptr. 297].) See Penal Code sections 1054.2 and 1054.10 for examples of statutory restrictions on whether a lawyer may release client papers. Other statutory provisions might require the lawyer to provide client papers to someone other than the client, and in those situations paragraph (e) is intended to apply equally to the duty to provide papers to that other person. (See Penal Code section 1054.2(b).) Paragraph (e) also requires the lawyer to "promptly" return unearned fees paid in advance. If a client disputes the amount to be returned, the lawyer shall comply with [Rule 1.15].

[10] A lawyer's duty under paragraph (e)(1) to release “writings” to the client includes all writings as defined in Evidence Code section 250. A lawyer must comply with paragraph (e)(1) without regard to whether the client has complied with an obligation to pay the lawyer's fees and costs. Paragraph (e)(1) does not prohibit a lawyer from making, at the lawyer's own expense, and retaining copies of papers released to the client, or to prohibit a claim for the recovery of the lawyer's expense in any subsequent legal proceeding. Paragraph (e)(1) also does not affirmatively grant to the lawyer a right to retain copies of client papers or to recover the cost of copying them; these are issues that might be determined by contract, court order, or rule of law.

Rule 2.4 Lawyer as Third-Party Neutral
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer is engaged to assist impartially two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute, or other matter, that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as a neutral arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.

(b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.

COMMENT

[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, neutral arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.

[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Judicial Council Standards for Mediators in Court Connected Mediation Programs or the Judicial Council Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration.

[3] Unlike non lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected.

[4] This Rule recognizes the inherent power of the Supreme Court of California to discipline a lawyer for conduct in which the lawyer engages either in or out of the legal profession. *In re Scott* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 968 [277 Cal.Rptr. 201]. The Supreme Court's inherent power is

not diminished simply because a lawyer acts as a third-party neutral as opposed to an advocate for a client. Nothing in this rule is intended to address the issue of whether a lawyer's conduct as a third-party neutral constitutes the practice of law.

[5] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12.

[6] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute resolution processes are governed by these Rules and the State Bar Act.

[7] Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to limit the applicability of any other rule or law.

[8] This Rule is not intended to apply to temporary judges, referees or court-appointed arbitrators. See Rule 2.4.1.

Rule 2.4.1 Lawyer as Temporary Judge, Referee, or Court-Appointed Arbitrator
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

A lawyer who is serving as a temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator, and is subject to Canon 6D of the Code of Judicial Ethics, shall comply with the terms of that canon.

COMMENT

[1] This Rule is intended to permit the State Bar to discipline lawyers who violate applicable portions of the Code of Judicial Ethics while acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity pursuant to an order or appointment by a court.

[2] Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to limit the applicability of any other rule or law.

[3] This Rule is not intended to apply to a lawyer serving as a third-party neutral in a mediation or a settlement conference, or as a neutral arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration agreement. See Rule 2.4.

Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not bring, continue or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

(b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or for the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

Comment

[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. This Rule also prohibits a lawyer from continuing an action after the lawyer knows that it has no basis in law or fact for doing so that is not frivolous. See Business and Professions Code sections 6068(c) and (g), Civil Procedure Code section 128.7, and Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

[3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.

[4] This Rule applies to proceedings of all kinds, including appellate and writ proceedings.

Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence, or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

(b) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or the lawyer's client has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce;

(c) falsify evidence or counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely;

(d) advise or directly or indirectly cause a person to secrete himself or herself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making that person unavailable as a witness therein;

(e) offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law, or directly or indirectly pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness's testimony or the outcome of the case. Except where prohibited by law, a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:

(1) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying;

(2) reasonable compensation to a witness for loss of time in attending or testifying; or

(3) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.

(f) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; or

(g) in trial, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness.

Comment

[1] The procedures of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.

[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. It is a criminal offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose

commencement can be foreseen. (See, e.g., Penal Code section 135; 18 United States Code section 1501-1520.) Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. (See, e.g., Penal Code section 132; 18 United States Code section 1519.) Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. Applicable law may require a lawyer to turn evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authorities, depending on the circumstances. (See *People v. Lee* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 514, 526 [83 Cal.Rptr. 715]; *People v. Meredith* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682 [175 Cal.Rptr. 612].)

[3] A violation of a civil or criminal discovery rule or statute does not by itself establish a violation of this Rule. This Rule does not establish a standard that governs civil or criminal discovery disputes.

[4] Paragraph (e) permits a lawyer to pay a non-expert witness for the time spent preparing for a deposition or trial. Compensation for preparation time or for time spent testifying must be reasonable in light of all the circumstances and cannot be contingent upon the content of the witness's testimony or on the outcome of the matter. Possible bases upon which to determine reasonable compensation include the witness' normal rate of pay if currently employed, what the witness last earned if currently unemployed, or what others earn for comparable activity.

Rule 3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) Except as permitted by the Code of Judicial Ethics, a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly give or lend anything of value to a judge, official, or employee of a tribunal unless the personal or family relationship between the lawyer and the judge, official, or employee is such that gifts are customarily given and exchanged. This Rule shall not prohibit a lawyer from contributing to the campaign fund of a judge running for election or confirmation pursuant to applicable law pertaining to such contributions.

(b) Unless authorized to do so by law, the Code of Judicial Ethics, a ruling of a tribunal, or a court order, a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly communicate with or argue to a judge or judicial officer upon the merits of a contested matter pending before the judge or judicial officer, except:

(1) in open court;

(2) with the consent of all other counsel in the matter;

(3) in the presence of all other counsel in the matter;

(4) in writing with a copy thereof furnished promptly to all other counsel; or

(5) in ex parte matters as permitted by law.

(c) As used in this Rule, "judge" and "judicial officer" shall include law clerks, research attorneys, other court personnel who participate in the decisionmaking process, and neutral arbitrators.

(d) A lawyer connected with a case shall not communicate directly or indirectly with anyone the lawyer knows to be a member of the venire from which the jury will be selected for trial of that case.

(e) During a trial a lawyer connected with the case shall not communicate directly or indirectly with any juror.

(f) During a trial a lawyer who is not connected with the case shall not communicate directly or indirectly concerning the case with anyone the lawyer knows is a juror in the case.

(g) A lawyer shall not communicate directly or indirectly with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:

(1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;

(2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate;

(3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment; or

(4) the communication is intended to influence the juror's actions in future jury service.

(h) A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly conduct an out of court investigation of a person who is either a member of a venire or a juror in a manner likely to influence the state of mind of such person in connection with present or future jury service.

(i) All restrictions imposed by this Rule also apply to communications with, or investigations of, members of the family of a person who is either a member of a venire or a juror.

(j) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a person who is either a member of a venire or a juror, or by another toward a person who is either a member of a venire or a juror or a member of his or her family, of which the lawyer has knowledge.

(k) This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with persons who are members of a venire or jurors as a part of the official proceedings.

(l) For the purposes of this Rule, "juror" means any empaneled, discharged, removed, or excused juror.

COMMENT

[1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the Code of Judicial Ethics and Code Civ. P. section 170.9, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions.

[2] During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order, but a lawyer who is serving as a temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator under Rule 2.4.1 may do so in the performance of that service. "Promptly" as used in paragraph (b)(4) of this Rule means that a copy of a communication to a judge should be sent to opposing counsel by means likely to result in receipt of the copy of the communication substantially simultaneously to its receipt by the judge.

[3] For guidance on permissible communications with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury, see also Code of Civil Procedure, section 206.

[4] It is improper for a lawyer to communicate with a juror who has been removed, discharged, or excused from an empaneled jury, regardless of whether notice is given to other counsel, until such time as the entire jury has been discharged from further service or unless the communication is part of the official proceedings of the case.

Rule 3.10 Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not threaten to present criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.

(b) As used in paragraph (a) of this Rule, the term "administrative charges" means the filing or lodging of a complaint with a federal, state, or local governmental entity which may order or recommend the loss or suspension of a license, or may impose or recommend the imposition of a fine, pecuniary sanction, or other sanction of a quasi-criminal nature but does not include filing charges with an administrative entity required by law as a condition precedent to maintaining a civil action.

(c) As used in this Rule, the term "civil dispute" means a controversy or potential controversy over the rights and duties of two or more parties under civil law, whether or not an action has been commenced, and includes an administrative proceeding of a quasi-civil nature pending before a federal, state, or local governmental entity.

Comment

[1] This Rule prohibits a lawyer from threatening to present criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute and does not apply to a threat to bring a civil action. It also does not prohibit actually presenting criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges, even if doing so creates an advantage in a civil dispute. Whether a lawyer's statement violates this Rule depends on the specific facts. (See, e.g., *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117 [177 Cal.Rptr 670].) A statement that the lawyer will pursue "all available legal remedies," or words of similar import, by itself does not violate this Rule.

[2] This Rule does not apply to (i) a threat to initiate contempt proceedings for a failure to comply with a court order; or (ii) the offer of a civil compromise in accordance with a statute such as Penal Code sections 1377-78.

[3] Paragraph (b) exempts the threat of filing an administrative charge which is a prerequisite to filing a civil complaint on the same transaction or occurrence.

Rule 4.2: Communication With a Person Represented By Counsel

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.

(b) For purposes of this Rule, a "person" includes:

(1) A current officer, director, partner, or managing agent of a corporation, partnership, association, or other represented organization; or

(2) A current employee, member, agent or other constituent of a represented organization if the subject matter of the communication is any act or omission of the employee, member, agent or other constituent in connection with the matter, which may be binding upon or imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability, or if the statement of such person may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.

(c) This Rule shall not prohibit:

(1) Communications with a public official, board, committee or body; or

(2) Communications initiated by a person seeking advice or representation from an independent lawyer of the person's choice; or

(3) Communications authorized by law or a court order.

(d) When communicating on behalf of a client with any person as permitted by this Rule, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.

(e) In any communication permitted by this Rule, a lawyer shall not seek to obtain privileged or other confidential information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person may not reveal without violating a duty to another or which the lawyer is not otherwise entitled to receive.

(f) A lawyer for a corporation, partnership, association or other organization shall not represent that he or she represents all employees, members, agents or other constituents of the organization unless such representation is true.

(g) As used in this Rule, "public official" means a public officer of the United States government, or of a state, or of a county, township, city, political subdivision, or other governmental organization, with the equivalent authority and responsibilities as the non-public organizational constituents described in paragraph (b)(1).

COMMENT

Overview and Purpose

[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship, and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation.

[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

[3] This Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.

[4] As used in paragraph (a), "the subject of the representation," "matter," and "person" are not limited to a litigation context. This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

[5] The prohibition against "indirect" communication with a person represented by counsel in paragraph (a) is intended to address situations where a lawyer seeks to communicate with a represented person through an intermediary such as an agent or investigator.

[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications with a represented person, or an employee, member, agent, or other constituent of a represented organization, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy, investigation or other matter between the government and a private person, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with the other, or with nonlawyer representatives of the other, regarding a separate matter.

Communications Between Represented Persons

[7] This Rule does not prohibit represented persons from communicating directly with one another, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising the lawyer's client that such communication may be made. A lawyer may advise a client about what to say or not to say to a represented person and may draft or edit the client's communications with a represented person, subject to paragraph (e).

[8] This Rule does not prevent a lawyer who is a party to a matter from communicating directly or indirectly with a person who is represented in the matter. To avoid possible abuse in such situations, the lawyer for the represented person may advise his or her client (1) about the risks and benefits of communications with a lawyer-party, and (2) not to accept or engage in communications with the lawyer-party.

Knowledge of Representation and Limited Scope Representation

[9] This Rule applies where the lawyer has actual knowledge that the person to be contacted is represented by another lawyer in the matter. However, knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. (See Rule 1.0.1(f).)

[10] When a lawyer knows that a person is represented by another lawyer on a limited basis, the lawyer may communicate with that person with respect to matters outside the scope of the limited representation. (See Comment [6].) In addition, this Rule does not prevent a lawyer from communicating with a person who is represented by another lawyer on a limited basis where the lawyer who seeks to communicate does not know about the other lawyer's limited representation because that representation has not been disclosed. In either event, a lawyer seeking to communicate with such person must comply with paragraphs (d) and (e) or with Rule 4.3.

Represented Organizations and Constituents of Organizations

[11] "Represented organization" as used in paragraph (b) includes all forms of governmental and private organizations, such as cities, counties, corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and unincorporated associations.

[12] As used in paragraph (b)(1) "managing agent" means an employee, member, agent or other constituent of a represented organization with general powers to exercise discretion and judgment with respect to the matter on behalf of the organization. A constituent's official title or rank within an organization is not necessarily determinative of his or her authority.

[13] Paragraph (b)(2) applies to current employees, members, agents, and constituents of the organization, who, whether because of their rank or implicit or explicit conferred authority, are authorized to speak on behalf of the organization in connection with the subject matter of the representation, with the result that their statements may constitute an admission on the part of the organization under the applicable California laws of agency or evidence. (See Evidence Code section 1222.)

[14] If an employee, member, agent, or other constituent of an organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel is sufficient for purposes of this Rule.

[15] This Rule generally does not apply to communications with an organization's in-house lawyer who is acting as a legal representative of the organization where the organization is also represented by outside legal counsel in the matter that is the subject of the communication. However, this Rule does apply when the in-house lawyer is a "person" under paragraph (b)(2) with whom communications are prohibited by the Rule.

Represented Governmental Organizations

[16] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that when a lawyer communicates on behalf of a client with a governmental organization special considerations exist as a result of the rights conferred under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 3 of the California Constitution. A "public official" as defined in paragraph (g) means government officials with the equivalent authority and responsibilities as the non-public organizational constituents described in paragraph (b)(1). Therefore, a lawyer seeking to communicate on behalf of a client with a governmental organization constituent who is not a public official must comply with paragraph (b)(2) when the lawyer knows the governmental organization is represented in the matter. In addition, the lawyer must also comply with paragraphs (d) and (e) when the lawyer knows the governmental organization is represented

in the matter that is the subject of the communication, and otherwise must comply with Rule 4.3.

Represented Person Seeking Second Opinion

[17] Paragraph (c)(2) permits a lawyer who is not already representing another person in the matter to communicate with a person seeking to hire new counsel or to obtain a second opinion where the communication is initiated by that person. A lawyer contacted by such a person continues to be bound by other Rules of Professional Conduct. (See, e.g., Rules 7.3 and 1.7.)

Communications Authorized by Law or Court Order

[18] This Rule controls communications between a lawyer and persons the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel unless a statutory scheme, court rule, case law, or court order overrides the Rule. There are a number of express statutory schemes which authorize communications that would otherwise be subject to this Rule. These statutes protect a variety of other rights such as the right of employees to organize and to engage in collective bargaining, employee health and safety, or equal employment opportunity.

[19] Paragraph (c)(3) recognizes that prosecutors or other lawyers representing governmental entities in civil, criminal, or administrative law enforcement investigations, or in juvenile delinquency proceedings, as authorized by relevant federal and state, constitutional, decisional and statutory law, may engage in legitimate investigative activities, either directly or through investigative agents and informants. Although the "authorized by law" exception in these circumstances may run counter to the broader policy that underlies this Rule, nevertheless, the exception in this context is in the public interest and is necessary to promote legitimate law enforcement functions that would otherwise be impeded. Communications under paragraph (c)(3) implicate other rights and policy considerations, including a person's right to counsel under the 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and parallel provisions of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., Art. I, §15), that are beyond the scope of this Comment. In addition, certain investigative activities might be improper on grounds extraneous to this Rule or in circumstances where a government lawyer engages in misconduct or unlawful conduct.

[20] Former Rule 2-100 prohibited communications with a "party" represented by another lawyer, while paragraph (a) of this Rule prohibits communications with a "person" represented by another lawyer. This change is not intended to preclude legitimate communications by or on behalf of prosecutors, or other lawyers representing governmental entities in civil, criminal, or administrative law enforcement investigations, that were recognized by the former Rule as authorized by law, or to expand or limit existing law that permits or prohibits communications under paragraph (c)(3). This change also is not intended to preclude the development of the law with respect to which criminal and civil law enforcement communications are authorized by law.

[21] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible might be able to seek a court order. A lawyer also might be able to seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury.

Prohibited Objectives of Communications Permitted Under This Rule

[22] A lawyer who is permitted to communicate with a represented person under this Rule must comply with paragraphs (d) and (e).

[23] In communicating with a current employee, member, agent, or other constituent of an organization as permitted under paragraph (b)(2), including a public official or employee of a governmental organization, a lawyer must comply with paragraphs (d) and (e). A lawyer must not seek to obtain information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is subject to an evidentiary or other privilege of the organization. (See [Rule 4.4.]) Obtaining information from a current or former employee, member, agent, or other constituent of an organization that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is legally protected from disclosure may also violate Rules [4.4], 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).

[24] When a lawyer's communications with a person are not subject to this Rule because the lawyer does not know the person is represented by counsel in the matter, or because the lawyer knows the person is not represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3.

Rule 4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person incorrectly believes the lawyer is disinterested in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. If the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of an unrepresented person are in conflict with the interests of the client, the lawyer shall not give legal advice to that person, except that the lawyer may, but is not required to, advise the person to secure counsel.

(b) In communicating with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not seek to obtain privileged or other confidential information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person may not reveal without violating a duty to another or which the lawyer is not otherwise entitled to receive.

COMMENT

[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In acting to correct a misunderstanding about the lawyer's role, a lawyer may disclose the client's identity if it is not confidential. Whether the lawyer identifies the lawyer's client, the lawyer shall explain, where necessary, that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For guidance when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f).

[2] Paragraph (a) requires that a lawyer not mislead the person concerning the lawyer's role in the matter, or the identity or interest of the person whom the lawyer represents. For example, a lawyer may not falsely state or create the impression that the lawyer represents no one, or that the lawyer is acting impartially or that the lawyer will protect the interest of both the client and the unrepresented non-client. Paragraph (a) also requires that the lawyer not take advantage of the unrepresented person's misunderstanding.

[3] Paragraph (a) distinguishes between the situation in which a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that an unrepresented person has interests that are adverse to those of the lawyer's client and the situation in which the lawyer does not have that actual or presumed knowledge. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person's interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. A lawyer does not give legal advice merely by stating a legal position on behalf of the lawyer's client. A lawyer also does not give legal advice merely by negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may state a legal position on behalf of the lawyer's client, inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the

meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations.

[4] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer, in communicating with a person who is not represented by counsel, from seeking to obtain information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is subject to an evidentiary or other privilege, or is otherwise protected from disclosure by a legally cognizable duty owed by the unrepresented person. A lawyer who obtains information from an unrepresented person that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is legally protected from disclosure might also violate Rules [4.4], 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).

[5] Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to obtain information from an unrepresented person through the use of discovery in litigation or interrogation at trial.

[6] Paragraph (a) does not apply to lawful covert criminal or civil investigations by government or private lawyers.

Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm comply with these Rules and the State Bar Act.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer complies with these Rules and the State Bar Act.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of these Rules and the State Bar Act if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner, or individually or together with other lawyers has comparable managerial authority, in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

COMMENT

Paragraph (a) – Duties Of Partners and Managers To Reasonably Assure Compliance with the Rules.

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a law firm. See Rule 1.0.1 (Law Firm definition).

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the law firm will comply with these Rules and the State Bar Act. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property, and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

[3] Paragraph (a) is also intended to apply to internal policies and procedures of a law firm that involve compensation and career development of lawyers in the law firm that may induce a violation of these Rules and the State Bar Act. See Rule 2.1 and Rule 8.4(a).

[4] Whether particular measures or efforts satisfy the requirements of paragraph (a) may depend upon the law firm's structure and the nature of its practice , including the size of the law firm, whether it has more than one office location or practices in more than one jurisdiction, or whether the firm or its partners engage in any ancillary business.

[5] A partner, shareholder or other lawyer in a law firm who has intermediate managerial responsibilities, including lawyers with intermediate managerial responsibilities in a legal services organization, a law department of an enterprise or a governmental

agency, may not be required to implement particular measures under paragraph (a) if the law firm has a designated managing lawyer charged with that responsibility, or a management committee or other body that has appropriate managerial authority and is charged with that responsibility. However, such a lawyer remains responsible to take corrective steps if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the delegated body or person is not providing or implementing measures as required by this Rule.

[6] Paragraph (a) also requires managers, including lawyers who are in charge of a public sector legal agency or the head of a legal department, to make reasonable efforts to assure that other lawyers in the agency or department comply with these Rules and the State Bar Act. The creation and implementation of reasonable guidelines relating to the assignment of cases and the distribution of workload among lawyers in the agency or department are examples of the kind of measures contemplated by the Rule. See, e.g., State Bar of California, GUIDELINES ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES DELIVERY SYSTEMS (2006).

[7] Paragraph (a) does not apply to lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in public sector legal agencies and law departments. See comments [5] and [8].

Paragraph (b) – Duties of Lawyer as Supervisor

[8] Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have direct supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers whether or not the subordinate lawyers are members or employees of the law firm. Paragraph (b) applies to all supervisory lawyers including lawyers who are not partners in a partnership or shareholders in a professional law corporation. Paragraph (b) also applies to lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in public sector legal agencies and law departments.

[9] A lawyer with supervisory responsibility over another lawyer has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to insure that the other lawyer complies with these Rules and the State Bar Act. Adequate supervision is particularly important when dealing with inexperienced lawyers.

[10] Whether a lawyer has direct supervisory authority over another lawyer in particular circumstances is a question of fact. A lawyer in charge of a particular client matter has direct supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers engaged in the matter.

Paragraph (c) – Responsibility for Another's Lawyer's Violation

[11] Paragraph (c)(1) applies to any lawyer who orders or knowingly ratifies another lawyer's conduct that violates these Rules and the State Bar Act.

[12] Under paragraph (c)(2) a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, and a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer, may be responsible for the conduct of the other lawyer, whether or not the other lawyer is a member or employee of the law firm. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer

knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension consistent with the lawyers' duty not to disclose confidential information under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1).

[13] A supervisory lawyer may violate paragraph (b) by failing to make the efforts required under that paragraph, even if the lawyer does not violate paragraph (c) by knowingly directing or ratifying the conduct, or where feasible, failing to take reasonable remedial action.

[14] Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) create independent bases for discipline. This Rule does not impose vicarious responsibility on a lawyer for the acts of another lawyer who is in or outside the law firm. Apart from paragraph (c) of this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate, or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

[15] This Rule does not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a law firm to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).

Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall comply with these Rules and the State Bar Act notwithstanding that the lawyer acts at the direction of another lawyer or other person.

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate these Rules or the State Bar Act if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

COMMENT

[1] The fact that a lawyer is under the supervisory authority of another lawyer does not excuse the subordinate lawyer from the obligation to comply with these Rules or the State Bar Act. Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acts at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether the lawyer has violated the Rules or the Act. See Rule 8.4(a). For example, if a subordinate signs a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not violate the Rules or the Act unless the subordinate knows of the document's frivolous character.

[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to the lawyers' responsibilities under these Rules or the State Bar Act and the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. Accordingly, the subordinate lawyer must comply with his or her obligations under paragraph (a). If the question reasonably can be answered more than one way, the supervisory lawyer may assume responsibility for determining which of the reasonable alternatives to select, and the subordinate may be guided accordingly. If the subordinate lawyer believes that the supervisor's proposed resolution of the arguable question of professional duty would result in a violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act, the subordinate is obligated to communicate his or her professional judgment regarding the matter to the supervisory lawyer.

Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner, or individually or together with other lawyers has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and [knows] of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

COMMENT

[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose confidential information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. (See, e.g., *Waysman v. State Bar* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452 [224 Cal.Rptr. 101]; *Trousil v. State Bar* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; *Palomo v. State Bar* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122 [177 Cal.Rptr. 670]; *Black v. State Bar* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288]; *Vaughn v. State Bar* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713]; *Moore v. State Bar* (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161].) The measures employed in instructing and supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they may not have legal training.

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with these Rules and the State Bar Act. See Comment [2] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers with managerial authority in corporate and government legal departments and legal service organizations as well as to partners and other managing lawyers in private law firms.

[3] Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act if engaged in by a lawyer.

Rule 5.3.1 Employment of Disbarred, Suspended, Resigned, or Involuntarily Inactive Member

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) For the purposes of this Rule:

(1) "Employ" means to engage the services of another, including employees, agents, independent contractors and consultants, regardless of whether any compensation is paid;

(2) "Member" means a member of the State Bar of California.

(3) "Involuntarily inactive member" means a member who is ineligible to practice law as a result of action taken pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6007, 6203(d)(1), or California Rule of Court 958(d); and

(4) "Resigned member" means a member who has resigned from the State Bar while disciplinary charges are pending.

(b) A lawyer shall not employ, associate professionally with, or aid a person the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member to perform the following on behalf of the lawyer's client:

(1) Render legal consultation or advice to the client;

(2) Appear on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, commissioner, or hearing officer;

(3) Appear as a representative of the client at a deposition or other discovery matter;

(4) Negotiate or transact any matter for or on behalf of the client with third parties;

(5) Receive, disburse or otherwise handle the client's funds; or

(6) Engage in activities which constitute the practice of law.

(c) A lawyer may employ, associate professionally with, or aid a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member to perform research, drafting or clerical activities, including but not limited to:

(1) Legal work of a preparatory nature, such as legal research, the assemblage of data and other necessary information, drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other similar documents;

(2) Direct communication with the client or third parties regarding matters such as scheduling, billing, updates, confirmation of receipt or sending of correspondence and messages; or

(3) Accompanying an active member in good standing of the bar of a United States state in attending a deposition or other discovery matter for the limited purpose of providing clerical assistance to the lawyer who will appear as the representative of the client.

(d) Prior to or at the time of employing a person the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member, the lawyer shall serve upon the State Bar written notice of the employment, including a full description of such person's current bar status. The written notice shall also list the activities prohibited in paragraph (b) and state that the disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member will not perform such activities. The State Bar may make such

information available to the public. The lawyer shall serve similar written notice upon each client on whose specific matter such person will work, prior to or at the time of employing such person to work on the client's specific matter. The lawyer shall obtain proof of service of the client's written notice and shall retain such proof and a true and correct copy of the client's written notice for two years following termination of the lawyer's employment by the client.

(e) A lawyer may, without client or State Bar notification, employ a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member whose sole function is to perform office physical plant or equipment maintenance, courier or delivery services, catering, reception, typing or transcription, or other similar support activities.

(f) Upon termination of the employment of a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member, the lawyer shall promptly serve upon the State Bar written notice of the termination.

COMMENT

[1] Paragraph (d) is not intended to prevent or discourage a lawyer from fully discussing with the client the activities that will be performed by the disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member on the client's matter. If a lawyer's client is an organization, then the written notice required by paragraph (d) shall be served upon the duly authorized officer, employee, or constituent overseeing the particular engagement. See Rule 1.13.

[2] Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to limit or preclude any activity engaged in pursuant to Rules 9.45 [registered legal services attorneys], 9.46 [registered in-house counsel] 9.47 [attorneys practicing law temporarily in California as part of litigation], 9.48 [non-litigating attorneys temporarily in California to provide legal services], 9.40 [counsel pro hac vice], 9.41 [appearances by military counsel], 9.42 [certified law students], 9.43 [out-of-state attorney arbitration counsel program] and 9.44 [registered foreign legal consultant] of the California Rules of Court, or any local rule of a federal district court concerning admission pro hac vice.

Rule 5.4: Duty to Avoid Interference with a Lawyer's Professional Independence

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees directly or indirectly with a person who is not a lawyer or with an organization that is not authorized to practice law. This paragraph does not prohibit:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate to provide for the payment of money or other consideration at once or over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;

(2) any payment authorized by Rule 1.17;

(3) a lawyer or law firm including nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement, provided the plan does not otherwise violate these Rules or the State Bar Act; or

(4) the payment of a prescribed registration, referral, or other fee by a lawyer to a lawyer referral service established, sponsored and operated in accordance with the State Bar of California's minimum standards for a lawyer referral service in California.

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership or other organization with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership or other organization consist of the practice of law.

(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's provision of legal services, or otherwise to interfere with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, or with the lawyer-client relationship, in rendering such legal services.

(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or organization authorized to practice law for a profit if:

(1) a person who is not a lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;

(2) a person who is not a lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies a position of similar responsibility in any form of organization other than a corporation; or

(3) a person who is not a lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

(e) A lawyer shall not accept a referral from, or otherwise participate in, a lawyer referral service unless it complies with the Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Lawyer Referral Services as adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar.

(f) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a non-profit legal aid, mutual benefit or advocacy group if the nonprofit organization allows any third person or organization to interfere with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, or with the lawyer-client relationship, or allows or aids any person, organization or group that is not a lawyer or not otherwise authorized to practice law, to practice law unlawfully.

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer is required to maintain independence of professional judgment in rendering legal services. The provisions of this Rule protect the lawyer's independence of professional judgment by restricting the sharing of fees with a person or organization that is not authorized to practice law and by prohibiting a nonlawyer from directing or controlling the lawyer's professional judgment when rendering legal services to another.

[2] The prohibition against sharing fees "directly or indirectly" in paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer or law firm from paying a bonus to or otherwise compensating a nonlawyer employee from general revenues received for legal services, provided the arrangement does not interfere with the independence of professional judgment of the lawyer or lawyers in the firm and does not violate any other rule of professional conduct. However, a nonlawyer employee's bonus or other form of compensation may not be based on a percentage or share of fees in specific cases or legal matters.

[3] Paragraph (a) also does not prohibit the payment to a nonlawyer third party for goods and services to a lawyer or law firm even if the compensation for such goods and services is paid from the lawyer's or law firm's general revenues. However, the compensation to a nonlawyer third party may not be determined as a percentage or share of the lawyer's or law firm's overall revenues or tied to fees in particular cases or legal matters. A lawyer may pay to a nonlawyer third party, such as a collection agency, a percentage of past due or delinquent fees in matters that have been concluded that the third party collects on the lawyer's behalf.

[4] Other rules also protect the lawyer's independence of professional judgment. See, e.g., Rule 1.5.1, Rule 1.8.6, and Rule 5.1.

[5] A lawyer's shares of stock in a professional law corporation may be held by the lawyer as a trustee of a revocable living trust for estate planning purposes during the lawyer's life, provided that the corporation does not permit any nonlawyer trustee to direct or control the activities of the professional law corporation.

[6] The distribution of legal fees pursuant to a referral agreement between lawyers who are not associated in the same law firm is governed by Rule 1.5.1 and not this Rule.

[7] A lawyer's participation in a lawyer referral service established, sponsored, supervised, and operated in conformity with the Minimum Standards for a Lawyer Referral Service in California is encouraged and is not, of itself, a violation of this Rule. See also Business and Professions Code section 6155.

[8] Paragraphs (a) and (b) do not prohibit the payment of court-awarded legal fees to non-profit legal aid, mutual benefit, and advocacy groups that are not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. (See *Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc.* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 23 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 221].) (See also Rule [6.3].)

[9] This Rule applies to group, prepaid, and voluntary legal service programs, activities and organizations and to non-profit legal aid, mutual benefit and advocacy groups. However, nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to authorize the practice of law by any such program, organization or group.

[10] This Rule is not intended to abrogate case law regarding the relationship between insurers and lawyers providing legal services to insureds. (See *Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor Associates* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 392].)

Rule 5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer admitted to practice law in California shall not:

(1) practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or

(2) knowingly assist a person or organization in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.

(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice law in California shall not:

(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish or maintain a resident office or other systematic or continuous presence in California for the practice of law; or

(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in California.

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. Paragraph (a) prohibits the unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person in the performance of activities that constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits lawyers from practicing law in California unless admitted to practice in this state or otherwise entitled to practice law in this state by court rule or other law. (See, e.g., California Business and Professions Code, sections 6125 and 6126. See also California Rules of Court, rules 9.45 [registered legal services attorneys], 9.46 [registered in-house counsel], 9.47 [attorneys practicing law temporarily in California as part of litigation], 9.48 [non-litigating attorneys temporarily in California to provide legal services], 9.40 [counsel pro hac vice], rule 9.41 [appearance by military counsel], 9.42 [certified law students], rule 9.43 [out-of-state attorney arbitration counsel program] and rule 9.44 [registered foreign legal consultant].) A lawyer does not violate paragraph (b) to the extent the lawyer is engaged in activities authorized by any other applicable exception. (See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. sections 515-519, 530C(c)(1); 35 U.S.C. section 32(b)(2)(D) and *Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida* Bar (1963) 373 U.S. 379 [83 S.Ct. 1322]; *Augustine v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs* (Fed. Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 1334.)

Rule 5.6 Restrictions on a Lawyer's Right to Practice
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or

(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy

COMMENT

[1] An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for an agreement among partners imposing a reasonable cost on departing partners who compete with the law firm in a limited geographical area as such an agreement strikes a balance between the interests of clients in having the attorney of choice, and the interest of law firms in a stable business environment. See *Howard v. Babcock* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 409, 425.

[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client.

[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17.

Rule 7.1 Communications Concerning the Availability of Legal Services

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) For purposes of Rules 7.1 through 7.5, "communication" means any message or offer made by or on behalf of a lawyer concerning the availability for professional employment of a lawyer or a lawyer's law firm directed to any former, present, or prospective client, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Any use of firm name, trade name, fictitious name, or other professional designation of such lawyer or law firm; or

(2) Any stationery, letterhead, business card, sign, brochure, domain name, Internet web page or web site, e-mail, other material sent or posted by electronic transmission, or other writing describing such lawyer or law firm; or

(3) Any advertisement (regardless of medium) of such lawyer or law firm directed to the general public or any substantial portion thereof; or

(4) Any unsolicited correspondence, electronic transmission, or other writing from a lawyer or law firm directed to any person or entity.

(b) A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication as defined herein.

(c) A communication is false or misleading if it:

(1) Contains any untrue statement; or

(2) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law; or

(3) Contains any matter, or presents or arranges any matter in a manner or format that is false, deceptive, or that confuses, deceives, or misleads the public; or

(4) Omits to state any fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under which they are made, not materially misleading.

(d) The Board of Governors of the State Bar may formulate and adopt standards as to communications that will be presumed to violate Rule 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 or 7.5. The standards shall only be used as presumptions affecting the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings involving alleged violations of these Rules. "Presumption affecting the burden of proof" means that presumption defined in Evidence Code sections 605 and 606. Such standards formulated and adopted by the Board, as from time to time amended, shall be effective and binding on all lawyers.

COMMENT

[1] This Rule governs all communications about the availability of legal services from lawyers and law firms, including advertising permitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them must be truthful. The requirement of truthfulness in a communication under this Rule includes representations about the law.

[2] This Rule prohibits truthful statements that are misleading. A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the

lawyer's communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is no reasonable factual foundation.

[3] An advertisement that truthfully reports a lawyer's achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each client's case. Similarly, an unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of other lawyers may be misleading if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison can be substantiated. The inclusion of an appropriate disclaimer or qualifying language may avoid creating unjustified expectations or otherwise misleading a prospective client.

[4] As used in paragraph (a), "writing" means any writing as defined in the Evidence Code.

[5] The list of communications under paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this Rule is not exclusive. For example, a lawyer's intentionally misleading use of metatags to divert a prospective client to the web site of the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm would also be prohibited under this Rule.

[6] See also Rule 8.4(e) for the prohibition against stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate these Rules or other law.

Standards

Pursuant to paragraph (d), the Board of Governors has adopted the following standards related to paragraph (b) of this Rule:

(1) A "communication" that contains guarantees, warranties, or predictions regarding the result of the representation.

(2) A "communication" that contains testimonials about or endorsements of a lawyer unless such communication also contains an express disclaimer such as "this testimonial or endorsement does not constitute a guarantee, warranty, or prediction regarding the outcome of your legal matter."

(3) A "communication" that contains a dramatization unless such communication contains a disclaimer that states "this is a dramatization" or words of similar import.

(4) A "communication" that states or implies "no fee without recovery" unless such communication also expressly discloses whether or not the client will be liable for costs.

(5) A "communication" that states or implies that a lawyer is able to provide legal services in a language other than English unless the lawyer can actually provide legal services in such language or the communication also states in the language of the communication (a) the employment title of the person who speaks such language and (b) that the person is not a member of the State Bar of California, if that is the case.

(6) An unsolicited “communication” transmitted to the general public or any substantial portion thereof primarily directed to seeking professional employment primarily for pecuniary gain that sets forth a specific fee or range of fees for a particular service where, in fact, the lawyer charges a greater fee than advertised in such communication within a period of 90 days following dissemination of such communication, unless such communication expressly specifies a shorter period of time regarding the advertised fee. Where the communication is published in the classified or “yellow pages” section of telephone, business or legal directories or in other media not published more frequently than once a year, the lawyer shall conform to the advertised fee for a period of one year from initial publication, unless such communication expressly specifies a shorter period of time regarding the advertised fee.

Rule 7.2 Advertising
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through any written, recorded or electronic media, including public media.

(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services except that a lawyer may

(1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule;

(2) pay the usual charges of a legal services plan or a qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service established, sponsored and operated in accordance with the State Bar of California's minimum standards for a lawyer referral service in California;

(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17; and

(4) refer clients to another lawyer or non-lawyer pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under these Rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if

(i) the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive, and

(ii) the client is informed of the existence and nature of the agreement.

(5) offer or give a gift or gratuity to any person or entity having made a recommendation resulting in the employment of the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm, provided that the gift or gratuity was not offered or given in consideration of any promise, agreement, or understanding that such a gift or gratuity would be forthcoming or that referrals would be made or encouraged in the future.

(c) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.

COMMENT

[1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through advertising. The public's need to know about legal services is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. Lawyers must be aware, however, that advertising by them entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.

[2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly

represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.

[3] This Rule permits advertising by electronic media, including but not limited to television, radio and the Internet. But see Rule 7.3(a) concerning real-time electronic communications with prospective clients.

[4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as court-approved class action notices.

Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer

[5] Lawyers are not permitted to pay others for channeling professional work. Paragraph (b)(1), however, allows a lawyer to pay for advertising and communications permitted by this Rule, including the costs of print directory listings, on-line directory listings, newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain-name registrations, sponsorship fees, banner ads, and group advertising. A lawyer may also compensate employees, agents and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development services, such as publicists, public-relations personnel, business-development staff and website designers. See Rule 5.3 for the duties of lawyers and law firms with respect to the conduct of nonlawyers who prepare marketing materials for them.

[6] Paragraph (b)(2) permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a group or pre-paid legal service plan exempt from registration under Business & Professions Code section 6155(c). Paragraph (b)(2) permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a qualified lawyer referral service established, sponsored and operated in accordance with the State Bar of California's minimum standards for a lawyer referral service in California. See Business & Professions Code, section 6155, and rules and regulations pursuant thereto. See also Rule 5.4(a)(4).

[7] A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. See Rules 5.3 and 5.4. Legal service plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with prospective clients, but such communication must be in conformity with these Rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the communications of a group advertising program or a group legal services plan would mislead prospective clients to think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time contacts that would violate Rule 7.3.

[8] Paragraph (b)(4) permits a lawyer to make referrals to another, in return for the undertaking of that person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer. Such reciprocal referral arrangements must not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment as to making referrals or as to providing substantive legal services. See Rule 5.4 (c). A lawyer does not violate paragraph (b)(4) of this Rule by agreeing to refer clients or customers to another, so long as the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive and the client is informed of the referral agreement. Conflicts of interest created by arrangements made pursuant to paragraph (b)(4) are governed by Rule 1.7. Reciprocal referral agreements should not be of indefinite duration and should be reviewed periodically to determine whether they comply with these Rules. This Rule does not restrict referrals or divisions of revenues or net income among lawyers within a law firm comprised of multiple

entities. A division of fees between or among lawyers not in the same law firm is governed by Rule 1.5.1.

Required information in advertisements

[9] Paragraph (c) also applies to a group of lawyers that engages in cooperative advertising. Any such communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name and office address of at least one member of the group responsible for its content. See also Business & Professions Code section 6155(h). See also Business & Professions Code section 6159.1, concerning the requirement to retain any advertisement for one year.

Rule 7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not by in person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless the communication is protected from abridgment by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitution of the State of California, or unless the person contacted:

(1) is a lawyer; or

(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.

(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by written, recorded or electronic communication or by in person, telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:

(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or

(2) the solicitation is transmitted in any manner which involves intrusion, coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, or vexatious or harassing conduct.

(c) Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter shall include the words "Advertising Material" or words of similar import on the outside envelope, if any, and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communication, unless the recipient of the communication is a person specified in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2), or unless it is apparent from the context that the communication is an advertisement.

(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not owned or directed by the lawyer that uses in person or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.

COMMENT

[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in direct in person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact by a lawyer with a prospective client known to need legal services. These forms of contact between a lawyer and a prospective client subject the layperson to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a direct interpersonal encounter. The prospective client, who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services, may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer's presence and insistence upon being retained immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over reaching.

[2] This potential for abuse inherent in direct in person, live telephone or real-time electronic solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising and written and

recorded communication permitted under Rule 7.2 offer alternative means of conveying necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Advertising and written and recorded communications which may be mailed or autodialed make it possible for a prospective client to be informed about the need for legal services, and about the qualifications of available lawyers and law firms, without subjecting the prospective client to direct in person, telephone or real-time electronic persuasion that may overwhelm the client's judgment.

[3] The use of general advertising and written, recorded or electronic communications to transmit information from a lawyer to prospective clients, rather than direct in person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact, will help to assure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. The contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 can be permanently recorded so that they cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications, in violation of Rule 7.1.

[4] There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an individual who is a former client, or with whom the lawyer has a close personal or family relationship, or in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain. Nor is there serious potential for abuse when the person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, the general prohibition in paragraph (a) and the requirements of paragraph (c) are not applicable in those situations. Also, paragraph (a) is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of bona fide public or charitable legal-service organizations, or bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organizations whose purposes include providing or recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries.

[5] Even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, any solicitation which (i) contains information which is false or misleading within the meaning of Rule 7.1, (ii) is transmitted in any manner which involves intrusion, coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, or vexatious or harassing conduct within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2), or (iii) involves contact with a prospective client who has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1).

[6] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from contacting representatives of organizations or groups that may be interested in establishing a bona fide group or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds, beneficiaries or other third parties for the purpose of informing such entities of the availability of and details concerning the plan or arrangement which the lawyer or lawyer's firm is willing to offer.

[7] The requirement in paragraph (c) that certain communications be marked "Advertising Material" or with words of similar import does not apply to communications sent in response to requests of potential clients or their representatives. Paragraph (c) also does not apply to general announcements by lawyers, including but not limited to changes in personnel or office location, nor does it apply where it is apparent from the context that the communication is an advertisement.

[8] Paragraph (d) of this Rule permits a lawyer to participate with an organization which uses personal contact to solicit members for its group or prepaid legal service plan, provided that the personal contact

is not undertaken by any lawyer who would be a provider of legal services through the plan. The organization must not be owned by or directed (whether as manager or otherwise) by any lawyer or law firm that participates in the plan. For example, paragraph (d) would not permit a lawyer to create an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the lawyer and use the organization for the in person or telephone solicitation of legal employment of the lawyer through memberships in the plan or otherwise. The communication permitted by these organizations also must not be directed to a person known to need legal services in a particular matter, but is to be designed to inform potential plan members generally of another means of affordable legal services. Lawyers who participate in a legal service plan must reasonably assure that the plan sponsors are in compliance with Rules 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3(b). See also Rules 5.4 and 8.4(a).

Rule 7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer may also communicate that his or her practice is limited to or concentrated in a particular field of law, subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1.

(b) A lawyer registered to practice patent law before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patent Attorney" or a substantially similar designation;

(c) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may use the designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty" or a substantially similar designation.

(d) A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law, unless:

(1) the lawyer is certified as a specialist by the Board of Legal Specialization, or any other entity accredited by the State Bar to designate specialists pursuant to standards adopted by the Board of Governors; and

(2) the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the communication.

Rule 7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1.

(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.

(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.

COMMENT

[1] A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its lawyers, by the names of deceased or retired lawyers where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity, by a distinctive website address, or by a trade name such as the "ABC Legal Clinic." Use of such names in law practice is acceptable so long as it is not misleading in violation of Rule 7.1. If a private firm uses a trade name that includes a geographical name such as "Springfield Legal Clinic," the firm may have to expressly disclaim that it is a public legal aid agency to avoid a misleading implication. It is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm, or the name of a nonlawyer.

[2] With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact associated with each other in a law firm, may not denominate themselves as, for example, "Smith and Jones," for that title suggests that they are practicing law together in a firm. A lawyer may state or imply that the lawyer or lawyer's law firm is "of counsel" to another lawyer or a law firm only if the former has a relationship with the latter (other than as a partner or associate, or officer or shareholder pursuant to Business and professions Code sections 6160-6172) which is close, personal, continuous, and regular.

Rule 8.1 False Statement Regarding Application for Admission to Practice Law

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) An applicant for admission to practice law shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact in connection with that person's own application for admission.

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact in connection with another person's application for admission to practice law.

(c) An applicant for admission to practice law, or a lawyer in connection with an application for admission, shall not fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a statement known by the applicant or the lawyer to have created a material misapprehension in the matter, except that this Rule does not authorize disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

(d) As used in this Rule, "admission to practice law" includes admission or readmission to membership in the State Bar; reinstatement to active membership in the State Bar; an application for permission to appear pro hac vice; and any similar provision relating to admission or certification to practice law in California or elsewhere.

Comment

[1] A person who makes a false statement in connection with that person's own application for admission to practice law may be subject to discipline under this Rule after that person has been admitted.

[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of applicable state constitutions.

[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to practice law is governed by the rules applicable to the client lawyer relationship, including Rule 1.6. A lawyer representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding is not governed by this Rule but is subject to the requirements of Rule 3.3.

[4] The examples in paragraph (d) are illustrative. As used in paragraph (d), "similar provision relating to admission or certification" includes, but is not limited to, an application by an out-of-state attorney for admission to practice law under Business and Professions Code section 6062; an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice under Rule of Court 9.40; an application by military counsel to represent a member of the military in a particular cause under Rule of Court 9.41; an application to register as a certified law student under Rule of Court 9.42; proceedings for certification as a Registered Legal Services attorney under Rule of Court 9.45 and related State Bar Rules; certification as a Registered In-house Counsel under Rule of Court 9.46 and related State Bar Rules; certification as an Out-of-State Attorney Arbitration Counsel under Rule of Court 9.43, Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.4, and related State Bar Rules; and certification as a Registered Foreign Legal Consultant under Rule of Court 9.44 and related State Bar Rules.

[5] This Rule shall not prevent a lawyer from representing an applicant for admission to practice in proceedings related to such admission. Other laws or rules govern the responsibilities of a lawyer representing an applicant for admission. See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(c), (d) & (e)); Rule 3.3.

Rule 8.1.1 Compliance with Conditions of Discipline and Agreements in Lieu of Discipline

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

A member shall comply with the terms and conditions attached to any agreement made in lieu of discipline, disciplinary probation, and public or private reprovals.

Comment

[1] Other provisions also require a lawyer to comply with conditions of discipline. (See, e.g., Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivisions (k) & (l) and California Rules of Court, Rule 9.19.)

Rule 8.4 Misconduct
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce any violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act;

(b) commit a criminal act that involves moral turpitude or that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law, including when acting in propria persona, that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate these Rules or other law; or

(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

COMMENT

Paragraph (a)

[1] A lawyer is subject to discipline for knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate these Rules or the State Bar Act, or to do so through the acts of another, as when a lawyer requests or instructs an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf.

Paragraph (b)

[2] A lawyer may be disciplined under paragraph (b) for a criminal act that reflects adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some offenses carry no such implication. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category.

[2A] A lawyer may be disciplined for criminal acts as set forth in Article 6 of the State Bar Act, (Business & Professions Code, sections 6101 et seq.), or if the criminal act constitutes "other misconduct warranting discipline" as defined by California Supreme Court case law. (See e.g., *In re Kelley* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 487 [276 Cal.Rptr. 375]; *In re Rohan* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195, 203 [145 Cal.Rptr. 855] [wilful failure to file a federal income tax return]; *In re Morales* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 1 [196 Cal.Rptr. 353] [twenty-seven counts of failure to pay payroll taxes and unemployment insurance contributions as employer].)

[2B] In addition to being subject to discipline under paragraph (b), a lawyer may be disciplined under Business and Professions Code section 6106 for acts of moral turpitude that constitute gross negligence. (*Gassman v. State Bar* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 125 [132 Cal.Rptr. 675]; *Jackson v. State Bar* (1979) 23

Cal.3d 509 [153 Cal.Rptr. 24]; *In the Matter of Myrdall* (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 363 [habitual disregard of clients' interests]; *Grove v. State Bar* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 680 [58 Cal.Rptr. 564]. See also *Martin v. State Bar* (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717 [144 Cal.Rptr. 214]; *Selznick v. State Bar* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 704 [129 Cal.Rptr. 108]; *In the Matter of Varakin* (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal State Bar Rptr 179 [pattern of misconduct]; *In re Calloway* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [141 Cal.Rptr. 805 [act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man or woman owes to fellow human beings or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between human beings]; *In re Craig* (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93 [82 P.2d 442].)

Paragraph (d)

[2C] Paragraph (d) is not intended to prohibit activities of a lawyer that are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or by Article I, § 2 of the California Constitution. See, e.g, *Ramirez v. State Bar* (1980) 28 Cal 3d 402, 411 [169 Cal. Rptr 206] (a statement impugning the honesty or integrity of a judge will not result in discipline unless it is shown that the statement is false and was made knowingly or with reckless disregard for truth); *Matter of Anderson* (Rev. Dept 1997) 3 State Bar Court Rptr 775 (disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment); *Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States District Court for the Central District of California v. Yagman* (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (a lawyer's statement unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be sanctioned only if the statement poses a clear and present danger to the administration of justice).

[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual orientation, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (b).

[4] Testing the validity of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal is governed by Rule 1.2(d). Rule 1.2(d) is also intended to apply to challenges regarding the regulation of the practice of law.

[5] A lawyer's abuse of public office held by the lawyer or abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization, can involve conduct prohibited by this Rule.

[6] Alternative bases for professional discipline may be found in Article 6 of the State Bar Act, (Bus. & Prof. Code, sections 6100 et seq.), and published California decisions interpreting the relevant sections of the State Bar Act. This Rule is not intended to provide a basis for duplicative charging of misconduct for a single illegal act.

Rule 8.4.1 Prohibited Discrimination in Law Practice Management and Operation

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

(a) For purposes of this Rule:

(1) "knowingly permit" means a failure to advocate corrective action where the managerial or supervisory lawyer knows of a discriminatory policy or practice that results in the unlawful discrimination prohibited in paragraph (b); and

(2) "unlawfully" and "unlawful" shall be determined by reference to applicable state or federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability, and as interpreted by case law or administrative regulations.

(b) In the management or operation of a law practice , a lawyer shall not unlawfully discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability.

(c) No disciplinary investigation or proceeding may be initiated by the State Bar against a member under this Rule unless and until a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, other than a disciplinary tribunal, shall have first adjudicated a complaint of alleged discrimination and found that unlawful conduct occurred. Upon such adjudication, the tribunal finding or verdict shall then be admissible evidence of the occurrence or non-occurrence of the alleged discrimination in any disciplinary proceeding initiated under this Rule. In order for discipline to be imposed under this Rule, however, the finding of unlawfulness must be upheld and final after appeal, the time for filing an appeal must have expired, or the appeal must have been dismissed.

COMMENT

[1] Consistent with lawyers' duties to support the federal and state constitution and laws, lawyers should support efforts to eradicate illegal discrimination in the operation or management of any law practice in which they participate. Violations of federal or state anti-discrimination laws in connection with the operation of a law practice warrant professional discipline in addition to statutory penalties.

[2] This Rule applies to all managerial or supervisory lawyers, whether or not they have any formal role in the management of the law firm in which they practice. (See Rule 5.1. But see also Rule 8.4(g).) "Law practice" in this Rule means "law firm," as defined in Rule 1.0.1, a term that includes sole practices. It does not apply to lawyers while engaged in providing non-legal services that are not connected with or related to law practice, although lawyers always have a duty to uphold state and federal law, a breach of which may be cause for discipline. (See Business and Professions Code section 6068(a).)

[3] In order for discriminatory conduct to be sanctionable under this Rule, it first must be found to be unlawful by an appropriate civil administrative or judicial tribunal under applicable state or federal law. Until there is a finding of civil unlawfulness, there is no basis for disciplinary action under this Rule.

[4] A complaint of misconduct based on this Rule may be filed with the State Bar following a finding of unlawfulness in the first instance even though that finding thereafter is appealed.

[5] This Rule addresses the internal management and operation of a law firm. With regard to discriminatory conduct of lawyers while representing clients, see Rule 8.4(g).